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THE ARTICLE II SAFEGUARDS OF
FEDERAL JURISDICTION
Tara Leigh Grove*
Jurisdiction stripping has long been treated as a battle between Congress
and the federal judiciary. Scholars have thus overlooked the important (and
surprising) role that the executive branch has played in these jurisdictional
struggles. This Article seeks to fill that void. Drawing on two strands of
social science research, the Article argues that the executive branch has a
strong incentive to use its constitutional authority over the enactment and
enforcement of federal law to oppose jurisdiction-stripping measures. Notably,
this structural argument has considerable historical support. The executive
branch has repeatedly opposed jurisdiction-stripping proposals in Congress.
That has been true even when the President was otherwise deeply critical of
the federal courts’ constitutional jurisprudence (such as during the Franklin
Roosevelt and Reagan Administrations). Furthermore, even when
jurisdiction-stripping measures do become law, the executive branch controls
the enforcement of that law. The Department of Justice has repeatedly used
this enforcement authority to urge the courts to interpret jurisdictional restrictions narrowly in order to preserve jurisdiction over constitutional claims.
This executive branch practice has important implications for the current
Justice Department as it litigates cases brought by current and former detainees in the war on terror. One provision of the Military Commissions Act of
2006 appears to preclude any court from examining a detainee’s challenge to
his “conditions of confinement” during his detention. The executive branch
could substantially limit the impact of this law by conceding (as it has in
prior administrations) that the federal courts retain jurisdiction over constitutional claims.
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INTRODUCTION
Scholars have long debated the scope of Congress’s power to curb
federal jurisdiction. The recurring concern over this issue stems from an
apparent tension in Article III: Although that provision vests the federal
courts with the “judicial Power” to decide issues of federal law,1 it also
gives Congress broad power to regulate federal jurisdiction.2 Commentators worry that, when federal courts issue controversial opinions (or seek
to protect unpopular groups), Congress will respond by taking away their
power to decide cases altogether.
Although scholars have expressed concern about a variety of efforts
to limit federal jurisdiction, two issues have repeatedly dominated the debate: Congress’s authority to make broad “exceptions” to the Supreme
Court’s appellate jurisdiction and to strip all federal jurisdiction over con1. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.
2. See id. § 2 (providing Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction is subject to “such
Exceptions, and . . . such Regulations as the Congress shall make”); infra notes 17–18 and
accompanying text (describing congressional discretion in establishing and regulating
lower courts).
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stitutional claims.3 There seems to be a consensus that such laws would be
at odds with “the structure and spirit of the [Constitution].”4 But many
scholars nevertheless conclude that Congress could enact such statutes, if
it so chose.5 In short, a prevailing view is that the Constitution has left the
federal judiciary largely at the mercy of Congress.
This Article argues that scholars have overlooked an important (and
surprising) advocate for the federal judiciary in these jurisdictional struggles: the executive branch. The Constitution gives the President considerable authority to block constitutionally questionable legislation. The
President can veto problematic legislation or use the threat of a veto to
urge Congress to pursue other alternatives. Moreover, under Article II’s
Take Care Clause, the President is in charge of enforcing federal law in
the federal courts—a task that he has largely delegated to the
Department of Justice (DOJ).6 The executive branch can use this enforcement authority to ensure that laws are applied in a manner that accords with constitutional values.
Drawing on recent social science scholarship, this Article contends
that the executive branch has a strong incentive to use this constitutional
authority to oppose efforts to curb federal jurisdiction. First, social scientists have argued that the President often expresses his constitutional philosophy through litigation in the federal courts. Accordingly, the
President has some incentive to ensure that the federal courts retain jurisdiction over constitutional claims. These presidential incentives are reinforced by the institutional incentives of the DOJ. Relying on theories of
path dependence and institutional entrenchment, this Article argues that
the DOJ has a substantial interest in defending the authority of the federal judiciary, because it can thereby maintain its own enforcement
power. The DOJ has a particularly overriding interest in protecting the
3. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction
Stripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response to Justice Scalia, 107 Colum.
L. Rev. 1002, 1005 (2007) (urging Congress must give Supreme Court “the final judicial
word” on federal law); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, 96 Va.
L. Rev. 1043, 1086 (2010) (arguing “a statute withdrawing both Supreme Court and lower
federal court jurisdiction” over constitutional claims “would violate the Constitution”);
James E. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the Constitutionality of
Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation, 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 191, 213 (2007) [hereinafter
Pfander, Federal Supremacy] (asserting lower courts must be subject to Supreme Court
“oversight and control”); Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term—
Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress’ Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction
of the Federal Courts, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 17, 66 (1981) (contending Congress must provide
federal court review of constitutional claims).
4. Paul M. Bator, Congressional Power over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27
Vill. L. Rev. 1030, 1039 (1982).
5. See Peter J. Smith, Textualism and Jurisdiction, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 1883, 1892–94
(2008) (noting “the traditional view” of Article III is that Congress has plenary power over
federal jurisdiction); infra notes 14–22 and accompanying text (explaining “plenary
power” theory).
6. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 3 (specifying President “shall take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed”).
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appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, because the Solicitor
General is in charge of all federal litigation at that level. By defending the
authority of the Supreme Court, the DOJ can maximize its power and
influence over the development of federal law.
In sum, this Article contends that the executive branch has strong
institutional incentives to oppose the very kind of legislation that scholars
find most problematic: restrictions on the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction and the federal courts’ authority to adjudicate constitutional
claims. The executive branch should be inclined to use its constitutional
authority to shield the judiciary from such challenges to the federal judicial power.
This structural argument has considerable historical support. The
executive branch has sought to protect federal jurisdiction in two major
ways. First, the executive branch has repeatedly opposed bills targeted at
the Supreme Court’s appellate review power or at federal jurisdiction
over constitutional claims.7 Notably, that has been true even when the
President strongly disagreed with the federal courts’ constitutional jurisprudence. For example, during the New Deal era, the Roosevelt Justice
Department opposed efforts to eliminate the Supreme Court’s appellate
jurisdiction over constitutional claims.8 Likewise, the Reagan Justice
Department spoke out against proposals to strip federal jurisdiction over
cases involving school prayer and abortion.9 Other DOJ officials have similarly urged Congress to refrain from enacting jurisdiction-stripping proposals, at times expressly invoking the threat of a presidential veto.
Although most jurisdiction-stripping bills have been defeated in the
legislative process, some proposals to curb federal jurisdiction have, in
recent decades, captured sufficient political support to gain the assent of
both Congress and the President. But the executive branch has an additional constitutional tool to limit the impact of such laws: The DOJ controls the enforcement of most federal laws and can urge the federal judiciary to interpret those laws narrowly in order to preserve federal
jurisdiction. That is the approach that recent Justice Departments have
taken. Both the Clinton and the second Bush Administrations urged the
courts to construe broadly worded jurisdiction-stripping statutes, like the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, so as to preserve jurisdiction over federal constitutional claims.10
The federal courts, of course, could disregard these arguments and
independently determine their jurisdiction. But, to the extent that the
7. See infra Part II (describing executive branch efforts to preserve jurisdiction
through legislative process).
8. See infra Part II.A (describing Roosevelt Administration’s opposition to efforts to
strip Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction).
9. See infra Part II.D (describing Reagan Justice Department’s opposition to
jurisdiction-stripping proposals).
10. See infra Part III.B.2 (describing Clinton and Bush Administration approaches to
federal jurisdiction).
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courts are already inclined to interpret jurisdiction-stripping laws narrowly, the DOJ’s arguments provide substantial reassurance that such
constructions will have the support of a coequal branch of the federal
government. And, in practice, the federal judiciary has proven quite receptive to the executive branch’s efforts to preserve the scope of federal
jurisdiction.
It is important, however, not to overstate the extent of these
Article II safeguards. First, the argument is limited to efforts to restrict
federal jurisdiction, where the executive branch has an institutional interest in preserving judicial authority. This Article does not claim that the
executive will oppose all court-curbing efforts. Furthermore, the executive branch has not sought to block every jurisdiction-stripping measure;
some have been enacted into law with the President’s assent. Finally, the
DOJ has not always advocated a narrow construction of jurisdictionstripping laws (although it has done so increasingly in recent years). But,
notwithstanding these exceptions, the executive branch has repeatedly
used its constitutional authority to protect the federal judicial power.
This argument has important implications for scholarship in federal
courts and constitutional law. First, this analysis provides a missing ingredient in the debate over Congress’s power to restrict federal jurisdiction
by emphasizing the substantial role that the executive branch has played
in these jurisdictional struggles. Moreover, this analysis offers an important correction to a theory that has gained traction in recent years: that
partisan politics has eclipsed the checks and balances created by the
Constitution, so that we now live in a world dominated by the “separation
of parties, not powers.”11 As this historical survey demonstrates, the executive branch has repeatedly opposed jurisdiction-stripping proposals in
Congress—even when those proposals were championed by members of
the President’s own party. Accordingly, in this crucial context, the judiciary has been protected by the separation of powers, not parties.
Finally, the analysis here has significant implications for the current
Justice Department as it litigates cases brought by current and former
detainees in the war on terror. The Military Commissions Act of 2006 (in
a provision that the Supreme Court has not yet construed) appears to
preclude any alleged “enemy combatant” from challenging, even on constitutional grounds, his “conditions of confinement” during his detention.12 The DOJ could substantially limit the impact of this legislation by
11. Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119
Harv. L. Rev. 2311, 2385 (2006) (“The enduring institutional form of democratic political
competition has turned out to be not branches but political parties.”); see also infra Part
IV.C.1 (describing how findings presented in this Article offer qualification to this theory).
12. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(2) (2006) (prescribing “no court, justice, or judge shall
have jurisdiction . . . [over any] action against the United States or its agents relating to any
aspect of the detention . . . or conditions of confinement” of an alleged enemy
combatant); Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2274 (2008) (declining to “discuss the
reach of the writ [of habeas corpus] with respect to claims of unlawful conditions of
treatment or confinement”).
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conceding, as it has in prior administrations, that the federal courts retain jurisdiction over federal constitutional claims.
The argument for these Article II safeguards proceeds as follows.
Part I discusses prior scholarship on Congress’s power to curb federal
jurisdiction. It asserts that the executive branch offers an important (and
previously overlooked) structural protection for the federal judiciary.
Parts II and III provide historical support for this claim, recounting how
the executive branch has used its role both in the legislative process and
in litigation to protect the scope of federal jurisdiction. Finally, Part IV
discusses the scope and limitations of these Article II safeguards. The
Article observes in part that the Justice Department may have an even
stronger incentive than the President to defend the judiciary and may
take advantage of “agency slack” to protect the scope of federal jurisdiction. The Article further asserts that, even in the context of the war on
terror, the executive branch could use its constitutional authority to protect the Article III judicial power.
I. THE THEORY
Scholars have long puzzled over the scope of Congress’s authority to
regulate federal jurisdiction. But two issues have dominated the debate:
Congress’s authority to restrict the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction and to strip all federal jurisdiction over constitutional claims. The
structural safeguards of Article II may work particularly well to protect
federal jurisdiction in these two contexts.13
A. The Search for Limits on Congress’s Power
Many commentators argue that Congress has plenary power over federal jurisdiction.14 These scholars note that, under Article III, the
13. The term “jurisdiction stripping” is used throughout this Article to refer to efforts
to restrict federal jurisdiction over a class of cases (such as cases involving school prayer).
Such jurisdictional restrictions are likewise the focus of other scholarly literature on this
subject. Accordingly, the definition does not include other types of statutory limitations on
federal jurisdiction, such as amount-in-controversy requirements.
14. See Charles L. Black, Jr., Decision According to Law 18 (1981) (“My own position
is . . . that Congress does have very significant power over the courts’ jurisdiction.”); Raoul
Berger, Insulation of Judicial Usurpation: A Comment on Lawrence Sager’s “CourtStripping” Polemic, 44 Ohio St. L.J. 611, 614 (1983) (“Congressional control of the courts’
jurisdiction under article III has the sanction of the First Congress, draftsmen of the
Judiciary Act of 1789, and of an unbroken string of decisions stretching from the
beginning of the Republic.”); John Harrison, The Power of Congress to Limit the
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts and the Text of Article III, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 203, 204 (1997)
(defending “the traditional view that Congress’s authority is substantial”); Martin H.
Redish, Text, Structure, and Common Sense in the Interpretation of Article III, 138 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 1633, 1637 (1990) [hereinafter Redish, Common Sense] (arguing “the inescapable
implication of the text is that Congress possesses broad power to curb the jurisdiction of
both the lower courts and the Supreme Court”); Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the
Constitution, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1001, 1005 (1965) (finding “no basis” for view that
Congress lacks such plenary power).
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Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction is subject to “such Exceptions,
and . . . such Regulations as the Congress shall make”15 and conclude that this
Exceptions Clause gives Congress broad power to remove cases from the
Court’s appellate oversight.16 There is even greater consensus on
Congress’s authority over the inferior federal courts. Under Article III,
the creation of those courts is left to the discretion of Congress.17 Most
commentators conclude that Congress may also determine to what extent
such courts are needed to enforce federal law.18 In sum, these scholars
reach what Martin Redish has described as the “inescapable” conclusion—that Congress’s authority over federal jurisdiction is unconstrained
by Article III.19
But even those who subscribe to this “plenary power” theory argue
that Congress should generally refrain from exercising its authority.20
They express particular concern about proposals to restrict the Supreme
Court’s appellate review power or the federal courts’ authority to hear
15. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2 (emphasis added).
16. See Bator, supra note 4, at 1038 (urging Exceptions Clause “plainly seems to
indicate that if Congress wishes to exclude a certain category of federal constitutional (or
other) litigation from the [Supreme Court’s] appellate jurisdiction, it has the authority to
do so”); Berger, supra note 14, at 622 (arguing “[t]he burden is on [those who would
challenge Congress’s authority] to demonstrate that the plenary, unequivocal terms of the
exceptions clause mean less than they say”); Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to
Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 Stan.
L. Rev. 895, 901 (1984) (urging “[o]n its face, the exceptions clause of article III, section 2,
seems to grant a quite unconfined power to Congress to withhold from the [Supreme]
Court a large number of classes of cases potentially within its appellate jurisdiction”);
Martin H. Redish, Congressional Power to Regulate Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction
Under the Exceptions Clause: An Internal and External Examination, 27 Vill. L. Rev. 900,
901–02 (1982) (“A common sense interpretation of the constitutional language [in the
Exceptions Clause] would seem to lead to the conclusion that Congress possesses fairly
broad authority to curb Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction.”).
17. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time
to time ordain and establish.”); Sager, supra note 3, at 48 (“[T]he Constitution neither
created nor forbade the creation of lower federal courts; their existence was left to the
discretion of Congress.”).
18. See, e.g., Bator, supra note 4, at 1030–31 (arguing Constitution “leaves it to
Congress to decide, having created lower federal courts, what their jurisdiction should
be”).
19. Redish, Common Sense, supra note 14, at 1637. These “plenary power” scholars
do generally assume that Congress’s authority is constrained by constitutional sources
other than Article III, and that the federal courts can enforce such “external” constraints—
although they often dispute the scope of those limits. See Gunther, supra note 16, at
916–22 (discussing some of the debates); Amanda L. Tyler, Suspension as an Emergency
Power, 118 Yale L.J. 600, 607–08 (2009) (noting Suspension Clause, “[b]y its terms, . . .
constitutes . . . a limitation upon . . . congressional power” over habeas jurisdiction, but
also observing that scholars have debated scope of that limit).
20. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Same-Sex Marriage, the Constitution, and
Congressional Power to Control Federal Jurisdiction: Be Careful What You Wish For, 9
Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 363, 369 (2005) (arguing “as a matter of policy,” Congress should
have “very strong presumption against” jurisdiction stripping).
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constitutional claims. For example, Paul Bator argued that “[a] statute
depriving the Supreme Court of appellate jurisdiction over . . . constitutional litigation would . . . violate the spirit of the Constitution, even if it
would not violate its letter.”21 Likewise, Gerald Gunther urged that, although Congress has the “sheer legal authority” to eliminate federal jurisdiction over constitutional claims, any such law would be “unwise” and
contrary to “the ‘spirit’ of the Constitution.”22
Other scholars, however, have proposed broader—and judicially enforceable—limits on Congress’s power over federal jurisdiction. Much of
this work (albeit not all23) also emphasizes the importance of the
Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction and federal jurisdiction over constitutional claims.
A growing number of commentators have argued that the Supreme
Court has an “essential role” in the constitutional scheme and that
Congress must provide the Court with sufficient appellate jurisdiction to
perform that role. The foundation for this argument was laid in a famous
essay by Henry Hart. Professor Hart asserted that “the exceptions [to the
Court’s appellate jurisdiction] must not be such as will destroy the essential role of the Supreme Court in the constitutional plan.”24 Leonard
Ratner and Evan Caminker later expanded upon this theory. Professor
Ratner argued that the Supreme Court’s “essential appellate functions”
are to preserve the uniformity and supremacy of federal law,25 while
Dean Caminker asserts that the Supreme Court must have sufficient ap-

21. Bator, supra note 4, at 1039.
22. Gunther, supra note 16, at 921. Professor Redish has suggested that a statute
preventing federal courts from adjudicating constitutional claims against federal officials
might violate the Due Process Clause—unless state courts were permitted to adjudicate
those claims. Martin H. Redish, Constitutional Limitations on Congressional Power to
Control Federal Jurisdiction: A Reaction to Professor Sager, 77 Nw. U. L. Rev. 143, 158–59
(1982).
23. There are, of course, important theories that do not focus on either the Supreme
Court or constitutional claims. See Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III:
Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. Rev. 205, 229–30 (1985)
(urging Congress must give either Supreme Court or inferior federal courts jurisdiction
over cases arising under federal law as well as admiralty and ambassador suits); Robert N.
Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original
Understanding of Article III, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 741, 749–50 (1984) (arguing Congress
must “allocate to the federal judiciary as a whole . . . every type of case or controversy”
listed in Article III).
24. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362, 1365 (1953).
25. Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 157, 161 (1960); see also Leonard G. Ratner,
Majoritarian Constraints on Judicial Review: Congressional Control of Supreme Court
Jurisdiction, 27 Vill. L. Rev. 929, 935 (1982) (reading Supremacy Clause as defining
Court’s “essential functions” to be enforcing uniformity and supremacy).

R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\COL\112-2\COL202.txt

258

unknown

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

Seq: 9

24-FEB-12

8:45

[Vol. 112:250

pellate jurisdiction to “provid[e] general leadership in defining federal
law” for the judiciary.26
Some scholars have recently claimed that, in order to maintain its
“supreme” role, the Supreme Court must have the power to review every
lower court case involving federal law. James Pfander asserts that the
Court must be able to review all lower federal and state court decisions
either on direct appeal or by issuing “supervisory writs,” such as writs of
habeas corpus or mandamus, in individual cases.27 Other commentators,
including Steven Calabresi and Gary Lawson, have argued that the
Supreme Court must have the authority to review every federal question,
either as an original matter or on appeal from a lower court.28 These
scholars claim that the Exceptions Clause does not permit Congress to
“strip” the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction at all, but only to move cases
between the Court’s original and appellate jurisdiction (a position that,
they acknowledge, is at odds with the holding of Marbury v. Madison that
Congress may not enlarge the size of the Court’s original jurisdiction).29
Furthermore, although scholars seem to agree that Congress has
more power over inferior federal court jurisdiction, they have often
sought to ensure that the federal courts as a whole can hear federal constitutional claims. For example, Professor Hart argued that, even if
Congress has the power to eliminate federal jurisdiction over constitutional issues, the judiciary should resist such efforts through statutory in26. Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?,
46 Stan. L. Rev. 817, 873 (1994).
27. James E. Pfander, One Supreme Court: Supremacy, Inferiority, and the Judicial
Power of the United States 25, 34–38 (2009); see James E. Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping
and the Supreme Court’s Power to Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1433, 1500
(2000) (arguing it would raise “serious constitutional questions” if Congress eliminated
both Court’s appellate jurisdiction and its authority to supervise lower federal courts by
issuing discretionary writs); see also Pfander, Federal Supremacy, supra note 3, at 236
(making similar claim with respect to state courts).
28. See Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 3, at 1023, 1038 (“Read holistically, the
constitutional text . . . says that there must be one Supreme Court which will have the last
word on all questions of federal law.”); Laurence Claus, The One Court that Congress
Cannot Take Away: Singularity, Supremacy, and Article III, 96 Geo. L.J. 59, 64 (2007)
(“Congress can never use the Exceptions power to remove from the Supreme Court the
ability to have ultimate judgment of Article III matters.”).
29. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174–80 (1803); see Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 3, at
1036–43 (contending “[t]he Exceptions Clause contemplates that Congress might move
cases back and forth between the Court’s original and appellate jurisdiction” and
acknowledging contention’s “inconsisten[cy] with the bedrock holding of Marbury v.
Madison”); Claus, supra note 28, at 77–80, 107 (arguing “Congress has power to remove
matters from the appellate-jurisdiction pasture, but that action does not let those matters
escape the field, it just shifts them to the original-jurisdiction pasture” and that Marbury
“risked the Court’s role as ultimate expositor of federal law under Article III”); Alex
Glashausser, A Return to Form for the Exceptions Clause, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 1383, 1390,
1397–99, 1406–07, 1449 (2010) (arguing “the Exceptions Clause simply serves as a
reminder that Congress may . . . rearrange jurisdictional form” and recognizing “cases such
as Marbury . . . more or less explicitly embraced the conception of jurisdiction-stripping
power”).
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terpretation.30 Professor Hart asserted: “If Congress wants to frustrate the
judicial check, our constitutional tradition requires that it be made to say
so unmistakably . . . .”31
Other scholars contend that a statute eliminating federal jurisdiction
over constitutional claims would violate Article III. Richard Fallon suggests that such a restriction would be invalid if Congress’s purpose were
to invite state court defiance of Supreme Court precedent.32 And
Lawrence Sager asserts that constitutional claims must be heard by judges
with life tenure and salary protections.33 Thus, Congress may take jurisdiction over such claims from either the Supreme Court or the lower
federal courts, but not both.
Some commentators have also recently emphasized the importance
of federal jurisdiction over constitutional claims in the context of the war
on terror. They focus on a provision of the Military Commissions Act of
2006 (MCA), which purports to prevent any federal court from reviewing
an action “against the United States or its agents relating to any aspect of
the . . . conditions of confinement” of a designated “enemy combatant.”34
(Notably, state courts likely have no power to review federal military detention;35 accordingly, this provision seems to cut off all judicial review of
detainee claims.)
Scholars assert that the MCA is unconstitutional to the extent that it
precludes federal jurisdiction over constitutional claims.36 For example,
Richard Fallon and Daniel Meltzer contend that the MCA’s “total preclusion of review” violates a fundamental “postulate of the constitutional
structure”: that “some court must always be open to hear an individual’s
claim to . . . judicial redress of a constitutional violation.”37 Janet
Alexander has asserted that “the complete denial of judicial review of
constitutional claims is beyond Congress’s power under the

30. Hart, supra note 24, at 1398–99.
31. Id. at 1399.
32. See Fallon, supra note 3, at 1083 (“Legislation barring both Supreme Court and
lower federal court jurisdiction over challenges to [state] legislation . . . should . . . be held
invalid based on its constitutionally forbidden purpose of encouraging defiance of
applicable Supreme Court precedent.”).
33. See Sager, supra note 3, at 65–66 (arguing “[c]laims of constitutional right
present the most compelling cases for the imposition of the article III requirements”).
34. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(2) (2006).
35. See Tarble’s Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 411–12 (1871) (preventing state courts
from issuing writs of habeas corpus to citizens held by federal officers).
36. See, e.g., Tyler, supra note 19, at 684 n.401 (describing conditions-of-confinement
provision as “deeply problematic . . . because of the principle . . . that some court must
stand open to vindicate constitutional rights for which tradition assigns a judicial
remedy”).
37. Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive
Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 2029, 2063 (2007).
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Exceptions . . . Clause” of Article III, because it deprives the Supreme
Court of its “‘essential role.’”38
The above scholarship reflects two basic normative premises:
Congress must provide the Supreme Court with sufficient jurisdiction to
perform its “supreme” role in the judiciary, and there must be judicial
review of constitutional claims. Furthermore, although these scholars offer sharply different theories, they do appear to agree on one thing: The
only way to limit Congress’s power is through judicial enforcement—either via statutory construction or judicial review.39 Absent such enforcement, the federal judiciary is essentially at the mercy of Congress.
My scholarship seeks to challenge that assumption. It asserts that the
primary constitutional protection for the federal judiciary lies not in judicial enforcement, but instead in the structural and political constraints
built into our constitutional system. My prior work focused on the
Article I lawmaking process, which gives competing political factions—
even political minorities—considerable power to “veto” legislation.40
Drawing on social science scholarship, I argued that political factions
have a substantial incentive to use their structural veto in the House or in
the Senate to block jurisdiction-stripping legislation favored by their
opponents.41
This Article contends that there is another important (and surprising) structural protection for the federal judiciary: the executive branch.
The executive has a strong incentive to use its independent role in the
enactment and enforcement of federal law to preserve the scope of federal jurisdiction. Furthermore, this incentive seems to be particularly
strong in the very areas that most concern scholars: the Supreme Court’s
appellate review power and federal jurisdiction over constitutional claims.
B. The Article II Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction
The Constitution gives the President an important role in both the
enactment and the enforcement of federal legislation. Article II provides
for an executive role in proposing legislation, stating that the President
“shall from time to time . . . recommend to [Congress] such Measures as
he shall judge necessary and expedient.”42 Furthermore, the President
has the constitutional authority to veto or threaten to veto any piece of
38. Janet Cooper Alexander, Jurisdiction-Stripping in a Time of Terror, 95 Calif. L.
Rev. 1193, 1208, 1239 (2007) (quoting Hart, supra note 24, at 1365). Professor Alexander
also contends that this provision violates the Suspension and Due Process Clauses. Id. at
1238–39.
39. See supra notes 20–33 and accompanying text (noting scholars sharing view that
judicial enforcement is only way to limit Congress’s power).
40. Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 124 Harv. L.
Rev. 869 (2011).
41. Id. at 890–91, 895–96, 901, 915.
42. U.S. Const. art. II, § 3 (“[The President] shall from time to time give to the
Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration
such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient . . . .”).
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legislation.43 As social scientists have observed, even the threat of a veto
can be a powerful tool, one that frequently leads Congress to modify or
even forego proposals before they reach the President’s desk.44 The
President can use this constitutional authority to block unconstitutional
(or at least constitutionally questionable) legislation and to steer
Congress toward proposals that he views as more constitutionally
legitimate.45
Moreover, once a bill is enacted into law, the President is in charge
of the enforcement and execution of that law. Article II requires the
President to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”46 The executive branch can use this enforcement authority to lessen the impact of
legislation that seems to impinge on constitutional values. Although
scholars dispute whether the President can simply decline to enforce statutes that he considers invalid,47 most commentators seem to agree that
43. See id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (“Every Bill which shall have passed the House of
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the
President of the United States . . . .”); Rebecca E. Deen & Laura W. Arnold, Veto Threats as
a Policy Tool: When to Threaten?, 32 Presidential Stud. Q. 30, 30 (2002) (asserting
“[p]residents have many tools in the policy-making process,” and that “[o]ne of the most
powerful of these is vetoing legislation”); Daniel E. Ingberman & Dennis A. Yao,
Presidential Commitment and the Veto, 35 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 357, 357 (1991) (arguing “[t]he
power to veto legislation is an important means through which a president can influence
policy”).
44. See Charles M. Cameron, Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative
Power 3 (2000) (examining “how presidents use vetoes and veto threats to wrest policy
concessions from Congress”); Richard S. Conley, George Bush and the 102d Congress: The
Impact of Public and “Private” Veto Threats on Policy Outcomes, 33 Presidential Stud. Q.
730, 731 (2003) (noting “presidents’ ability to halt” or change bills not only “through the
veto power” but also through “their strategic use of” veto threats); Deen & Arnold, supra
note 43, at 44 (noting “[t]he veto threat can be an effective tool in the arsenal of [the
president’s] legislative powers”).
45. See The Federalist No. 73, at 443 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (asserting veto power “not only serves as a shield to the executive, but . . . furnishes
an additional security against the enaction of improper laws”); J. Richard Broughton,
Rethinking the Presidential Veto, 42 Harv. J. on Legis. 91, 127–32 (2005) (noting modern
presidents have vetoed bills on constitutional grounds, albeit less often than early
presidents).
46. U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.
47. Compare, e.g., Eugene Gressman, Take Care, Mr. President, 64 N.C. L. Rev. 381,
382 (1986) (arguing once a bill becomes law, “the President has no option under article II
but to enforce the measure faithfully”), with David Barron, Constitutionalism in the
Shadow of Doctrine: The President’s Non-Enforcement Power, Law & Contemp. Probs.,
Winter/Spring 2000, at 61, 64 (asserting President should at times decline to enforce
statutes that would be upheld by courts because President can protect constitutional values
courts cannot enforce), Dawn E. Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement of
Constitutionally Objectionable Statutes, Law & Contemp. Probs., Winter/Spring 2000, at 7,
12–14 (arguing non-enforcement is appropriate in certain limited circumstances), Gary
Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81
Iowa L. Rev. 1267, 1303 (1996) (arguing President must refuse to enforce statutes he views
as unconstitutional), Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive
Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 Geo. L.J. 217, 221–22 (1994) (arguing President “may
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the executive branch can give such laws a narrow construction that better
accords with constitutional values.48 Indeed, Dawn Johnsen has asserted
that Presidents should “avoid constitutional problems . . . through their
interpretation of ambiguous statutes.”49
The executive branch has a strong incentive to use this constitutional
authority to oppose jurisdiction-stripping legislation. This argument is
based on two strands of recent social science research. First, social scientists have asserted that the President often advances his constitutional
philosophy through litigation in the federal courts.50 The judiciary serves
as a useful focal point for presidential policies, in part because the executive branch has “close contact” with the federal courts.51 The President
not only plays a central role in selecting federal judges52 but also
decline to execute acts of Congress on constitutional grounds,” and may even “refuse to
execute (or . . . obey) judicial decrees”), and Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The
Executive’s Duty to Disregard Unconstitutional Laws, 96 Geo. L.J. 1613, 1616 (2008)
(asserting “the Constitution actually requires the President to disregard unconstitutional
statutes”).
48. See Ronald A. Cass & Peter L. Strauss, The Presidential Signing Statements
Controversy, 16 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 11, 15–16 (2007) (asserting President’s “obligation
to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed’ . . . gives him authority to advise agencies
how they may avoid constitutional issues lurking in” complex statutes (quoting U.S. Const.
art. II, § 3)); Johnsen, supra note 47, at 9 (“Presidents often avoid constitutional problems,
as they should, through their interpretation of ambiguous statutes or through the exercise
of enforcement discretion.”); Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the
Executive Branch, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1189, 1226 (2006) (arguing if “[t]he fundamental
aim of the avoidance canon . . . is to implement constitutional norms,” then the executive
branch should “use the avoidance canon” in interpreting statutes); see also Cornelia T.L.
Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands, 103 Mich. L. Rev.
676, 677, 686 (2005) (arguing, in practice, executive branch has not protected individual
rights, although agreeing such constitutional enforcement is normatively attractive).
Notably, although Jefferson Powell argues that the executive branch should not use
statutory construction to protect its own power, he does not appear to question the
propriety of the practice in other contexts. H. Jefferson Powell, The Executive and the
Avoidance Canon, 81 Ind. L.J. 1313, 1316 (2006).
49. Johnsen, supra note 47, at 9.
50. See Keith E. Whittington, Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy: The
Presidency, the Supreme Court, and Constitutional Leadership in U.S. History 274 (2007)
[hereinafter Whittington, Foundations] (arguing Presidents often “[t]urn[ ] to the
judiciary . . . [to] advanc[e] constitutional goals”); Howard Gillman, Party Politics and
Constitutional Change: The Political Origins of Liberal Judicial Activism, in The Supreme
Court and American Political Development 138, 146–55 (Ronald Kahn & Ken I. Kersch
eds., 2006) [hereinafter Gillman, Constitutional Change] (discussing efforts of Kennedy
and Johnson Administrations to appoint judges who would favor civil rights and other
progressive causes).
51. See Whittington, Foundations, supra note 50, at 196.
52. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall nominate, and by and with
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . Judges of the supreme
Court . . . .”); Sheldon Goldman, Picking Federal Judges: Lower Court Selection from
Roosevelt Through Reagan 6 (1997) (“[T]he placement of the power of judicial selection
with the powers of the president [in Article II] rather than those of Congress suggests that
the executive branch is a principal player in the appointment process.”); Mark A. Graber,
James Buchanan as Savior? Judicial Power, Political Fragmentation, and the Failed 1831
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“[t]hrough control over the Justice Department . . . can exercise significant influence over . . . what arguments are presented” to the courts.53
The President has a particularly strong incentive to press his policies
through the federal judiciary when he faces a hostile (or divided)
Congress.54 For example, President Harry Truman expressly acknowledged his use of litigation to advance constitutional values in the face of
legislative opposition. President Truman explained that, after Congress
refused to pass a civil rights law, he “did what the President can do, unaided by the Congress.”55 He sent “the Department of Justice . . . into the
Supreme Court” to argue for constitutional rulings that would protect
civil rights.56 Likewise, Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush
sought to use the federal judiciary to advance their vision of constitutional federalism when their legislative efforts were stymied in
Congress.57
The President’s unique position in enforcing federal law gives him
an opportunity to advance his constitutional policies through litigation,
without substantial interference from the legislature. Political scientist
Keith Whittington asserts that this largely explains the President’s support for the judiciary, and particularly for the exercise of judicial review.58 This Article argues that this unique opportunity also gives the
President a strong incentive to ensure that the federal courts retain jurisdiction over constitutional claims.
These presidential incentives are reinforced by the institutional incentives of the Department of Justice. Drawing on theories of path dependence and institutional entrenchment,59 this Article contends that the
Repeal of Section 25, 88 Or. L. Rev. 95, 103 (2009) (“Presidents . . . typically have more
influence than legislators on the staffing of federal courts.”).
53. Whittington, Foundations, supra note 50, at 196.
54. See Graber, supra note 52, at 102 (observing judiciary can be “a vital presidential
ally against a recalcitrant Congress”).
55. President Harry S. Truman, Address in Harlem, New York, upon Receiving the
Franklin Roosevelt Award, 1948 Pub. Papers 923, 924 (Oct. 29, 1948).
56. Id.; see also Whittington, Foundations, supra note 50, at 99 (observing “Harry
Truman’s Justice Department . . . urged the Court to take action on” civil rights issues).
57. See Douglas W. Kmiec, The Attorney General’s Lawyer: Inside the Meese Justice
Department 136–37 (1992) (observing Reagan Administration used litigation “to redress
the federalism imbalance” in existing law); Gillman, Constitutional Change, supra note 50,
at 159.
58. See Whittington, Foundations, supra note 50, at 5 (arguing “[t]hrough much of
American history, presidents have found it in their interest to defer to the Court and
encourage it to take an active role in defining the Constitution and resolving constitutional
controversies”).
59. See Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic
Performance 100 (1990) (“Path dependence means that history matters. We cannot
understand today’s choices . . . without tracing the [past] . . . evolution of institutions.”);
Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis 35 (2004)
(“[S]ocial actors make commitments based on existing institutions and policies. As they do
so, the cost of reversing course generally rises dramatically.”). For a definition of “path
dependence,” see Margaret Levi, A Model, a Method, and a Map: Rational Choice in
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DOJ has a strong incentive to defend the scope of federal jurisdiction,
because it can thereby maintain its own authority and influence over the
development of federal law.
Social scientists have argued that institutions, like the judiciary, may
become “entrenched” (or “locked-in”) in part because they serve as
sources of power and influence for other groups in society.60 For example, many special interest groups have found that litigation is a useful way
to achieve their policy objectives.61 Such organizations develop considerable legal expertise (what social scientists refer to as “asset-specific investments” in the judicial system)62 and, as a result, have an interest in ensuring that legal and policy decisions are made by courts, rather than by
other government institutions.63 In other words, these “litigation machines” have a strong interest in the preservation (or entrenchment) of
the judiciary.64 Any policy that undermines the court system simultaneously takes away their primary source of power and influence.
Comparative and Historical Analysis, in Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and
Structure 19, 28 (Mark Irving Lichbach & Alan S. Zuckerman eds., 1997) (“Path
dependence has to mean, if it is to mean anything, that once a country or region has
started down a track, the costs of reversal are very high. . . . [T]he entrenchments of
certain institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choice.”).
60. See Pierson, supra note 59, at 35, 159 (“[I]nstitutions induce self-reinforcing
processes that make reversals increasingly unattractive over time. . . . Institutions and
policies may encourage individuals and organizations to invest in specialized skills . . . .
These activities increase the attractiveness of existing institutional arrangements [and] . . .
push individual behavior onto paths that are hard to reverse.”). Notably, the older an
institution is, the more “locked-in” it will be. See id. at 147 (asserting incentives created by
asset-specific investments are “likely to accumulate with the passage of time”).
61. See Paul Pierson & Shannon O’Neil Trowbridge, Asset Specificity and
Institutional Development 22 (Aug. 29–Sept. 1, 2002) (unpublished paper prepared for
delivery at the 2002 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association) (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (“[T]he strong role of U.S. courts in shaping public policy
encourages (and highly values) the development of legal expertise within lobbying
groups.”).
62. See Peter Alexis Gourevitch, The Governance Problem in International Relations,
in Strategic Choice and International Relations 137, 144–45 (David A. Lake & Robert
Powell eds., 1999) (“Political actors develop investments, ‘specific assets,’ in a particular
arrangement—relationships, expectations, privileges, knowledge of procedures, all tied to
the institutions at work. . . . [This] helps to explain institutional persistence. [A]ctors . . .
have incentives to protect their investment by opposing change.”).
63. See Pierson, supra note 59, at 159 (“[A] number of mechanisms . . . appear to
make expansions of court power virtually irreversible. The emergence of courts as the site
of political and legal dispute resolution generates a rapid expansion of law-centered actors
who have a considerable stake in preserving and expanding the use of these
procedures . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
64. Pierson & Trowbridge, supra note 61, at 22, 26 (“[M]any advocacy groups are
little more than fund-raising and litigation machines.”). Notably, social scientists do not
contend that change is impossible, just that it is made more difficult by these institutional
arrangements. See Pierson, supra note 59, at 52 (“Nothing in path-dependent analyses
implies that a particular alternative is ‘locked in’ following the move onto a self-reinforcing
path.”).
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This analysis also applies to the relationship between the DOJ and
the federal judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court. The DOJ’s primary
function is to represent the interests of the United States in federal
court.65 Thus, the Justice Department is, in many respects, the government’s “litigation machine.”66 The DOJ’s power and influence within the
executive branch is therefore greatest when decisions are hammered out
in litigation.
The DOJ’s “asset-specific investments” in the judiciary give it a strong
interest in preserving the federal courts’ authority. But that is particularly
true at the Supreme Court level. Although the DOJ is responsible for
most federal litigation, it does share some of that authority with other
agencies at the lower court level.67 In the Supreme Court, by contrast, the
Solicitor General is essentially the exclusive representative of the United
States.68 Thus, as former Solicitor General Drew Days put it, “[o]nce cases
reach the Supreme Court, the Solicitor General plays an important role
in the development of American law” and can have a substantial “impact

65. See 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2006) (“Except as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct
of litigation in which the United States . . . is interested . . . is reserved to officers of the
Department of Justice, under the direction of the Attorney General.”).
66. The DOJ does, of course, engage in nonlitigation activities, such as the law
enforcement tasks of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Agencies, http://www.justice.gov/agencies/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last
visited Oct. 18, 2011) (providing overview of current components of DOJ). But the DOJ’s
central function (and, indeed, the primary reason for its creation) is to litigate cases on
behalf of the United States. See Act of June 22, 1870, ch. 150, § 5, 16 Stat. 162, 163 (giving
DOJ power and responsibility to “conduct and argue” any “cases in which the United States
is interested”); Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3035 (1870) (statement of Rep. Thomas
Jenckes) (stating central object of “this bill [creating the DOJ] is to establish a staff of law
officers . . . to transact [the] law business of the Government in all parts of the United
States”).
67. See Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: Party
Polarization and the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. Rev. 459, 488 (2008)
(“Outside of Supreme Court litigation, which is typically controlled by the Solicitor
General, the President cannot use the Justice Department to ensure the legal policymaking
of [certain] independent agencies remains consistent with presidential priorities.”).
68. See 28 U.S.C. § 518(a) (“[T]he Attorney General and the Solicitor General shall
conduct and argue suits and appeals in the Supreme Court . . . .”); Fed. Election Comm’n
v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 513 U.S. 88, 93 (1994) (“[I]f a case is one ‘in which the
United States is interested,’ . . . ‘it must be conducted and argued in this Court by the
Solicitor General or his designee.’” (citation omitted) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 518(a); United
States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693, 700 (1988))). A narrow exception to this
rule is the Federal Trade Commission, which has limited independent litigating authority
before the Supreme Court. If the Solicitor General refuses the FTC’s request to seek
Supreme Court review, the FTC may file a petition for certiorari. Elliott Karr, Independent
Litigation Authority and Calls for the Views of the Solicitor General, 77 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
1080, 1085 (2009). But if the Solicitor General seeks certiorari, he is in charge of the case.
Id. at 1090. Notably, in one of the rare cases in which the FTC independently sought
certiorari, the Supreme Court still asked for the Solicitor General’s views of the case and
agreed with his recommendation that certiorari be denied. Id. at 1095–96.
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upon the establishment of constitutional and other principles.”69 For this
reason, the DOJ has a strong interest in the “entrenchment” of the
Court’s appellate review power.
These executive branch incentives (i.e., the President’s desire for a
judicial forum for constitutional claims and the DOJ’s interest in
Supreme Court review) provide considerable protection for the federal
judiciary. The executive branch has a strong incentive to use its authority
over the enactment and enforcement of federal law to safeguard federal
jurisdiction.
This structural claim has considerable historical support. The executive branch (as discussed in Part II) has repeatedly opposed jurisdictionstripping proposals in Congress, even when the President strongly disagreed with the federal courts’ jurisprudence.70 Thus, both the Roosevelt
and the Reagan Justice Departments fought efforts to strip the Supreme
Court’s appellate jurisdiction and to eliminate federal jurisdiction over
constitutional claims. Moreover (as discussed in Part III), even when
jurisdiction-stripping legislation has been enacted into law, the DOJ has
repeatedly urged the courts to construe those provisions narrowly in order to preserve federal jurisdiction over constitutional claims.71 The executive branch has thus turned out to be an important, and effective, advocate for the federal courts.
At the outset, however, it is important to note some qualifications
and clarifications about this argument. First (as discussed in Part IV),
these Article II safeguards are not absolute. Although the executive
branch has consistently opposed jurisdiction-stripping bills that were considered as stand-alone measures, more recent proposals have been part of
omnibus legislation (like the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act)—the bulk of which the President supported.72 As social scientists
have observed, Presidents rarely veto such omnibus legislation, even
when they oppose particular provisions on constitutional or policy
grounds.73 Presidents have thus assented to the jurisdictional restrictions
buried in such expansive statutes. Furthermore, the DOJ has not always
argued for a narrow construction of jurisdiction-stripping laws.74 But, no69. Drew S. Days III, Executive Branch Advocate v. Officer of the Court: The Solicitor
General’s Ethical Dilemma, 22 Nova L. Rev. 679, 680 (1998); see Richard L. Pacelle, Jr.,
Between Law & Politics: The Solicitor General and the Structuring of Race, Gender, and
Reproductive Rights Litigation 11 (2003) (arguing Solicitor General’s power has increased
as role of Supreme Court has grown in importance).
70. See supra notes 58–69 and accompanying text (examining executive branch’s
long-term institutional reasons to protect scope of federal jurisdiction).
71. See infra Part III (discussing DOJ’s history of advocating narrow construction of
jurisdiction-stripping laws).
72. See infra Part IV.B (discussing limits of Article II safeguards).
73. See infra notes 338–339 and accompanying text (discussing Presidents’ likelihood
of issuing signing statements rather than vetoing omnibus legislation).
74. See infra text accompanying notes 248–259 (discussing DOJ’s approach to
jurisdiction-stripping laws).
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tably, the Solicitor General has done so consistently in recent years—during the same period that Congress has relied on omnibus legislation.75
Thus, in the past few decades, even when the executive branch has failed
to protect the judiciary in the legislative process, it has done so via
litigation.
Second, this Article does not seek to evaluate whether the DOJ should
have argued for a narrow construction of these jurisdiction-stripping
laws.76 Instead, the goal here is to show that the executive branch’s institutional interest in preserving federal jurisdiction has led it to be an important (and previously overlooked) ally for the federal courts.
Finally, this Article does not mean to suggest that the executive
branch is exclusively focused on advancing its own power and entirely
unconcerned with constitutional values. Indeed, the very fact that the executive branch has repeatedly focused on the Supreme Court and constitutional claims suggests that it may share the intuition of scholars that
restricting jurisdiction in those areas would “violate the spirit of the
Constitution, even if it would not violate its letter.”77 Many members of
the executive branch may well share that basic constitutional intuition,
and that may motivate their conduct to some degree. But the institutional
incentives of the President and the DOJ help ensure that they will act
upon that intuition and oppose jurisdiction-stripping measures, even
when the President has other strong reasons to attack the federal courts.
Notably, this account of federal jurisdiction accords with the design
of our constitutional scheme of separated powers. James Madison hoped
that the Constitution “could be made politically self-enforcing by aligning
the political interests of officials . . . with constitutional rights and
rules.”78 Thus, “the great security . . . consists in giving to those who ad75. See infra Part IV.A.3, B (describing Solicitor General’s approach to jurisdictionstripping laws).
76. The DOJ has sometimes adopted a narrow construction of jurisdiction-stripping
laws even in the face of statutory language and legislative history strongly indicating that
Congress sought to strip all federal jurisdiction. See infra Part III. One might question
whether the DOJ in those cases was “faithfully” executing the law. But that normative
inquiry is not the focus of this Article.
77. Bator, supra note 4, at 1039. Furthermore, the President does have some interest
in ensuring that the federal courts maintain jurisdiction in other areas. He can use the
judiciary to pursue nonconstitutional policies in the face of legislative opposition. See
Whittington, Foundations, supra note 50, at 197 n.124 (noting “constitutional
interpretation is not the only form of policymaking that presidents might pursue through
the courts”). But, in part because of our longstanding tradition of judicial supremacy, it is
easier for the President to advance his constitutional philosophy in this context. The
President can use the administrative state to advance other policies. See Elena Kagan,
Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2248 (2001) (noting agencies can
“showcase and advance presidential policies”).
78. Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law,
Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1791, 1832 (2009); Daryl J. Levinson,
Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment, 124 Harv. L.
Rev. 657, 662 (2011).
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minister each department, the necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments of the others. . . . Ambition must
be made to counteract ambition.”79 In this context, the executive
branch’s “ambition”—its interest in preserving its own power and influence over the development of federal law—has led it to “resist” congressional encroachments on the federal judiciary. Thus, the executive
branch has used the structural tools of Article II to protect the Article III
judicial power.
II. ARTICLE II SAFEGUARDS

IN THE

LEGISLATIVE PROCESS

Beginning in the early twentieth century, there were a series of proposals to curtail the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction and federal
jurisdiction over constitutional claims.80 The executive branch repeatedly
opposed these proposals—not only when the President favored the fed-

79. The Federalist No. 51, at 289–90 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
80. There were also two significant efforts to strip the Supreme Court’s appellate
jurisdiction in the nineteenth century. The first challenge occurred in 1831, when the
House Judiciary Committee recommended that Congress repeal section 25 of the Judiciary
Act of 1789 (the provision authorizing Supreme Court review of state court decisions). See
7 Reg. Deb. app. at lxxvii (1831) (Report upon the Judiciary). During this period, the
nation was led by President Andrew Jackson (a well-known critic of the Marshall Court),
who might have been expected to favor such a restriction on the Court’s appellate review
power. But it does not appear that the executive branch took a position on this measure.
See Graber, supra note 52, at 126–32, 152 (detailing effort to repeal section 25 and
explaining southern Jacksonians supported such challenges to federal judicial power, while
northern Jacksonians opposed them and President Jackson generally “remained on the
sidelines” of these debates). Nor is it clear that President Jackson would have supported
the restriction. As Mark Graber has recounted, although President Jackson criticized the
Marshall Court, he also found the Court useful as a means of ensuring state compliance
with federal law. Accordingly, in 1833, in response to the nullification crisis with South
Carolina, he supported a measure to expand federal jurisdiction. See id. at 128–29, 142–43
(“Congress responded to the nullification crisis by passing legislation endorsed by
President Jackson that augmented federal courts’ authority. These courts, under the Force
Act of 1833, became the first line of defense against local challenges to protective tariffs.”);
see also 2 Charles Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History 199 n.1 (1922)
(describing as “false” the assumption that President Jackson supported repeal of section
25). In any event, the House of Representatives rejected the proposal to repeal section 25
by a sizeable margin (138–51), so the measure never went to the Senate or to the
President. See 7 Reg. Deb. 542 (1831) (recording vote rejecting proposed repeal of section
25); Charles Warren, Legislative and Judicial Attacks on the Supreme Court of the United
States—A History of the Twenty-Fifth Section of the Judiciary Act, 47 Am. L. Rev. 161,
163–64 (1913) (discussing proposal). The second major challenge to the Supreme Court’s
appellate jurisdiction occurred in 1868, when the Reconstruction Republicans sought to
restrict the Court’s power to review habeas corpus cases from lower federal courts.
President Andrew Johnson strongly opposed this measure, and it was enacted only over his
veto. See infra notes 81, 96, and 334 (discussing these events).
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eral courts’ jurisprudence,81 but also when he strongly opposed it.82 This
Part focuses on four cases involving Presidents from different political
parties, who had very different views of the federal judiciary.83 The consistency of the executive branch’s approach in these (otherwise distinct)
administrations indicates that the executive branch has strong long-term
institutional reasons to protect the scope of federal jurisdiction.
A. The Roosevelt Justice Department and Jurisdiction Stripping
Social scientists have argued that President Franklin Roosevelt was a
“reconstructive” leader, who sought to reshape the prior constitutional
and political order.84 For many decades, national politics had been dominated by concerns about economic growth and industrial development.
Accordingly, many prior Presidents had supported policies that aided
large corporations.85 In the wake of the stock market crash of 1929 and in
the midst of the Great Depression, President Roosevelt promised to usher
81. For example, the Kennedy Administration strongly favored reapportionment and
filed briefs in support of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962), and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). See Barry Friedman, The Will of the
People: How Public Opinion Has Influenced the Supreme Court and Shaped the Meaning
of the Constitution 270 (2009) (noting “the Kennedy administration supported the Baker
plaintiffs, filing an amicus brief” arguing apportionment violated Fourteenth
Amendment). Accordingly, it is perhaps unsurprising that Attorney General Robert
Kennedy was “strongly against” congressional efforts to strip federal jurisdiction over
reapportionment. Anthony Lewis, Democrats Weigh Policy on Seating and Districting, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 20, 1964, at 1. An analogous example comes from the nineteenth century. The
reconstruction laws were enacted over President Andrew Johnson’s veto. See Keith E.
Whittington, Bill Clinton Was No Andrew Johnson: Comparing Two Impeachments, 2 U.
Pa. J. Const. L. 422, 437 (2000) (“As Congress legislated its own Reconstruction policy,
Johnson exercised his veto power, throwing up obstructions more often than had any
previous President.”). It thus seems unsurprising that he also vetoed Congress’s attempt to
prevent the Supreme Court from reviewing those laws. See Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2d
Sess. 2094 (1868) (showing President vetoed bill on ground that it was “not in harmony
with the spirit and intention of the Constitution”). Congress, however, also overrode that
veto. Id. at 2128, 2170; see infra note 96 (discussing these events).
82. See infra Part II.A, D (discussing Roosevelt and Reagan Administrations).
83. This Part also focuses on cases in which there is publicly available information
about the executive branch’s views on jurisdiction stripping. Notably, these examples
appear to reflect the executive branch’s consistent practice. See 128 Cong. Rec. 9094 n.1
(1982) (letter from William French Smith, Att’y Gen. of the United States, to Sen. Strom
Thurmond, Chairman, S. Judiciary Comm.) (stating “[t]he Department of Justice . . . has
consistently opposed proposals to restrict Supreme Court jurisdiction” and citing both
public records and internal DOJ documents); infra notes 322–325 and accompanying text
(discussing DOJ’s reliance on its own precedents).
84. See Stephen Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John
Adams to Bill Clinton 36–37, 288 (1997) (identifying Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson,
Abraham Lincoln, and Franklin Roosevelt as Presidents who “constituted a politics of
reconstruction”); Whittington, Foundations, supra note 50, at 23 (naming Roosevelt
among reconstructive Presidents who adopted a “departmentalist” stance to constitutional
and political order).
85. See Howard Gillman, How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their
Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States, 1875–1891, 96 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 511,

R

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\COL\112-2\COL202.txt

270

unknown

Seq: 21

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

24-FEB-12

8:45

[Vol. 112:250

in a new “economic constitutional order.”86 He offered the nation a “New
Deal.”
Of course, the Supreme Court proved to be a substantial obstacle to
President Roosevelt’s reconstruction. Although the Court upheld parts of
what became the New Deal,87 it also invalidated key portions.88 For example, in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, the Court struck down
the National Industrial Recovery Act, the centerpiece of Roosevelt’s economic program.89 At a press conference following the Schechter decision,
President Roosevelt accused the Court of “relegat[ing]” the nation to the
“horse-and-buggy” age of interstate commerce and potentially undermining every New Deal reform.90 Although he declined to say “what [he was]
going to do” in response to the decision, he noted that various proposals
were being considered by “a central source—the Solicitor General and
the Attorney General.”91
The President made few other public attacks on the Court during
the next year and a half.92 But the Roosevelt Justice Department was indeed working behind the scenes to find a solution to the “Court problem.” There were many ideas: suggestions for constitutional amendments,
proposals to enlarge the size of the Supreme Court, and—most important for present purposes—efforts to curb federal jurisdiction.93 Although some legislators sought to curtail the jurisdiction of the lower fed517–18 (2002) [hereinafter Gillman, Agendas] (detailing use of court appointments and
institutional restructuring “to facilitate the Republican agenda of economic nationalism”).
86. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Campaign Address on Progressive Government at the
Commonwealth Club (Sept. 23, 1932), in 1 Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D.
Roosevelt 742, 752 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1938).
87. E.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62–63 (1932) (upholding Longshoremen’s
and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act); see also Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics
Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 215, 230 (2000)
(stating that before 1937, Supreme Court “upheld most elements of what became the New
Deal”).
88. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311–12 (1936) (invalidating
Bituminous Coal Conservation Act); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78 (1936) (striking
down part of Agricultural Adjustment Act); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935) (invalidating central provisions of National Industrial
Recovery Act on ground they only had an indirect effect on interstate commerce).
89. 295 U.S. at 551.
90. Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Two Hundred and Ninth Press Conference (May 31,
1935), in 4 Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, supra note 86, at 200,
221.
91. Id.
92. See William E. Leuchtenburg, The Supreme Court Reborn: The Constitutional
Revolution in the Age of Roosevelt 107 (1995) (noting Roosevelt’s reluctance to attack
Supreme Court prior to 1936 election); Jeff Shesol, Supreme Power: Franklin Roosevelt vs.
the Supreme Court 223–24 (2010) (noting Roosevelt’s awareness that “[h]istorically,
election-year attacks on the Court were a losing proposition”).
93. See Leuchtenburg, supra note 92, at 102 (“‘The years 1935–1937,’ Michael
Nelson has noted, ‘saw more Court-curbing bills introduced in Congress than in any other
three-year (or thirty-five year) period in history.’” (quoting Michael Nelson, The President
and the Court: Reinterpreting the Court-Packing Episode of 1937, 103 Pol. Sci. Q. 267, 273
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eral courts (which had also struck down New Deal programs),94 most
proposals were targeted at the Supreme Court. For example, soon after
the Schechter decision, former Senator Robert Owen contacted Roosevelt’s
first Attorney General Homer Cummings and suggested that Congress
could, pursuant to the Exceptions Clause, restrict the Supreme Court’s
appellate jurisdiction over constitutional claims.95
Two Justice Department attorneys were assigned the task of examining such proposals to strip federal jurisdiction.96 In a series of memoranda, Assistant Attorney General Alexander Holtzoff advised Attorney
General Cummings that “[t]he decisions of the Supreme Court . . . support the view” that Congress could restrict—and even eliminate—the
Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction.97 But he “greatly doubt[ed the]
wisdom” of such a restriction.98 Holtzoff was concerned in part about the
need for uniformity on issues of constitutional law. He declared that “it
would be a highly dangerous step to take away from the Supreme Court
(1988))); Shesol, supra note 92, at 203–04 (noting there were “more than a hundred”
proposals to curb Supreme Court).
94. See Memorandum from Warner W. Gardner, Dep’t of Justice, to the Solicitor
Gen. 2 (Dec. 10, 1936) [hereinafter Gardner Memo, Dec. 10, 1936] (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (explaining “the proposal that Congress eliminate from the
jurisdiction of the lower federal courts and from the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court the power to pass upon the constitutionality of an act of Congress”).
95. See Memorandum from Alexander Holtzoff, Dep’t of Justice, to the Att’y Gen.
1–4 (June 6, 1935) [hereinafter Holtzoff Memo, June 6, 1935] (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (noting suggestion by Robert Owen, Democratic Senator from Oklahoma).
Interestingly, no one seems to have suggested that the Court’s jurisdiction be restricted in
certain classes of cases. Thus, the DOJ analyzed Congress’s power to limit—or eliminate—
its appellate jurisdiction over all constitutional claims.
96. The attorneys focused in part on a precedent from the Reconstruction era. See id.
at 1–2 (citing relevant cases from Reconstruction era); Memorandum from Warner W.
Gardner, Dep’t of Justice, to the Solicitor Gen. 5 (Aug. 15, 1935) [hereinafter Gardner
Memo, Aug. 15, 1935] (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“Perhaps the most dramatic
instance of the extent of the congressional power to make exceptions from the appellate
jurisdiction of the Court is to be found in Ex parte McCardle . . . .”). In 1868, William
McCardle was arrested by federal military authorities in the South for publishing
newspaper articles that criticized the military’s reconstruction activities. See William W.
Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex parte McCardle, 15 Ariz. L. Rev. 229, 236 (1973)
(“[McCardle] was charged . . . solely on the basis of several vituperative, antireconstructionist editorials he had authored and published in the Times.”). When the
lower courts denied habeas relief, McCardle sought Supreme Court review under the
Habeas Corpus Act of 1867. Id. at 237. While the case was pending, Congress enacted
(over President Andrew Johnson’s veto) a statute that repealed the Court’s appellate
jurisdiction under the 1867 Act. Act of Mar. 27, 1868, ch. 34, 15 Stat. 44; Cong. Globe, 40th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2128, 2170 (1868). In Ex parte McCardle, the Supreme Court upheld
Congress’s power to withdraw its appellate jurisdiction over the case. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506,
515 (1868). But the Court emphasized that the statute had not cut off all avenues of
Supreme Court review. Id. The Court later explained in Ex parte Yerger that it could still
review lower court habeas decisions by way of an original habeas petition under the
Judiciary Act of 1789. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 105–06 (1868).
97. Holtzoff Memo, June 6, 1935, supra note 95, at 4.
98. Id. at 5.

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\COL\112-2\COL202.txt

272

unknown

Seq: 23

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

24-FEB-12

8:45

[Vol. 112:250

the power” to review lower federal court decisions in constitutional cases,
“for then we are likely to be confronted by a situation where a statute
might be valid in one Circuit and invalid in another.”99 In his view, the
best way to address the problems created by the Supreme Court’s decisions was to adopt a constitutional amendment.100
Assistant Solicitor General Warner Gardner also analyzed proposals
to eliminate the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction. He found that,
although Congress had broad power to restrict the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction,101 there was an important limit on Congress’s authority. The
Supreme Court’s “exercise of judicial power seems to be exempt from legislative interference under the separation of powers doctrine.”102
Gardner noted that it would be “difficult, of course, to fix the line
which separates judicial power, which is immune from Congressional regulation, and appellate jurisdiction, over which Congress has control.”103
But he found that it was unnecessary to determine “the precise limits of
the judicial power,” because he concluded that the Supreme Court’s “immunity from legislative control includes the power to declare legislation
unconstitutional.”104 Thus, he stated:
It is abundantly clear that the members of the Federal
Convention of 1787 viewed as one of the basic functions of the
judiciary the power to declare legislation unconstitutional. . . . It
would seem that a power apparently considered to be fundamental to the framework of our Government must be a judicial
power rather than a mere incident of jurisdiction, subject to regulation and control by Congress.105
Gardner also considered whether Congress could strip inferior federal court jurisdiction over constitutional claims. Although the Supreme
Court had often stated “in sweeping language” that Congress had essentially unlimited power over the lower courts,106 he concluded (with some
hesitation) that Congress could not strip jurisdiction over constitutional
claims.107 He stated that, even as to the lower courts, it seemed “relatively
clear that the power of judicial review” was an “inherent attribute of the
judicial power . . . beyond congressional control.”108
99. Memorandum from Alexander Holtzoff, Dep’t of Justice, to the Att’y Gen. 4–5
(June 22, 1935) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
100. See id. at 5 (“I am inclined to the belief that a constitutional amendment is
necessary in order to achieve the desired result.”).
101. Gardner Memo, Aug. 15, 1935, supra note 96, at 2–5.
102. Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 10, 13.
105. Id. at 10–11.
106. Gardner Memo, Dec. 10, 1936, supra note 94, at 39.
107. See id. at 47 (stating it was “impossible to reach any certain conclusion” on this
issue).
108. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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In subsequent months (and particularly after Roosevelt’s landslide
reelection in 1936), the President and Attorney General Cummings began to focus on alternative proposals, including suggestions that the
President “pack” the Supreme Court.109 The Attorney General asked
Gardner to analyze the various proposals.110 Gardner subsequently produced a lengthy memorandum, concluding that most of the suggestions—including, of course, the proposals to limit federal jurisdiction—
were either unwise or unconstitutional (or both).111 Ultimately, he determined that the proposal to enlarge the Supreme Court, while not without
flaw, was “the only one which is certainly constitutional and . . . may be
done quickly and with a fair assurance of success.”112 Indeed, it was the
only “undoubtedly constitutional method by which to obtain a more sympathetic majority of the Court.”113
President Roosevelt and Attorney General Cummings already favored the Court-packing idea, but Gardner’s memo seemed to confirm
the validity of the approach.114 Cummings asked Gardner to draft the
legislation that (after modifications by the Attorney General) became
Roosevelt’s famous Court-packing plan.115
The story of the Roosevelt Administration’s approach to the judiciary
thus reveals an apparent contradiction. Although the Roosevelt Justice
Department strongly opposed efforts to strip federal jurisdiction, the DOJ
not only supported but crafted what may be the most notorious Courtcurbing bill in history.116
But the difference between these types of “court-curbing” measures
may in fact say a great deal about the Article II safeguards of federal juris109. See Shesol, supra note 92, at 238, 242–43, 246–48 (discussing Roosevelt
Administration’s post-election deliberations on the judiciary).
110. See id. at 251–52 (“Cummings asked Gardner to consider every sensible
alternative to amending the Constitution, and to report back after the election.”).
111. Gardner Memo, Dec. 10, 1936, supra note 94, at 64–65 (“[I]n my opinion, the
objections of constitutional policy and judicial administration out-weigh any advantages
which it may offer.”); see also supra notes 101–108 and accompanying text (describing
Assistant Solicitor General Gardner’s analysis of proposals to strip Supreme Court of
appellate jurisdiction).
112. Gardner Memo, Dec. 10, 1936, supra note 94, at 57; see id. at 56 (noting policy
objections, including that proposal could “mak[e] the court . . . unwieldy”).
113. Id. at 65.
114. See Leuchtenburg, supra note 92, at 118 (stating “both the Attorney General and
the President had been attracted to ‘Court-packing’ for a long time”); Shesol, supra note
92, at 253 (asserting “Cummings saw in Gardner’s memo that which he wished to see—that
which confirmed the trend of his own thinking”).
115. See Shesol, supra note 92, at 253, 256 (“[Cummings] directed Gardner to draft a
bill enlarging the Supreme Court.”).
116. Of course, there were some dissenters within the Justice Department. Solicitor
General Stanley Reed did not support the Court-packing proposal. See id. at 255–56
(noting Solicitor General Reed “distanced himself” from project, perhaps because of
“simple discomfort at the idea of conspiring against the Court, when it was [his] job . . . to
represent the government before those same justices” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
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diction. As discussed, presidents have an incentive to preserve federal jurisdiction, because they can use the courts to advance their constitutional
philosophy. Those same incentives lead presidents to appoint judges who
are sympathetic to that philosophy. In short, presidents who seek to promote their constitutional views through the judiciary have a strong incentive to “pack” the federal courts. For that reason, as Professor Whittington
has observed, “Roosevelt’s proposal to pack the Court with his supporters
contained no provision requiring judicial restraint at all. . . . The administration hoped to harness the power of the Court, not destroy it.”117
Congress, in turn, seems to have rejected the Court-packing plan in
order to prevent such executive “harnessing.” As Jeff Shesol asserts in his
recent account of the Court-packing proposal, even Roosevelt’s
Democratic supporters ultimately opposed the plan because they viewed
it as a “power grab in the guise of reform.”118 “The idea of giving any
president . . . the authority to remake the Supreme Court virtually overnight was abhorrent.”119
The demise of the court-curbing proposals in the 1930s may thus be
a tribute to the constitutional separation of powers. The executive branch
resisted proposals to restrict federal jurisdiction and instead sought to
“harness the power of the Court.” Congress, in turn, sought to prevent
that from happening. Accordingly, “[a]mbition [was] made to counteract
ambition” in a manner that protected the constitutional value in an independent judiciary.120
B. Jurisdiction-Stripping Efforts in the Eisenhower Administration
The Supreme Court’s appellate review power once again became a
subject of controversy during the Second Red Scare.121 Although the
Supreme Court initially steered clear of the controversy (or upheld the
117. Whittington, Foundations, supra note 50, at 266–67 (“Even as [the
administration] sought to temporarily displace judicial authority, it was setting the stage
for its reconstruction.”).
118. Shesol, supra note 92, at 315–16, 321 (noting opposition of Senate progressives
was based on concerns about executive power); see Leuchtenburg, supra note 92, at 137
(observing some of Roosevelt’s opponents “compare[ed] [him] to Stuart tyrants and
European dictators”); Skowronek, supra note 84, at 322–23 (“The specter of European
autocrats . . . haunted this ‘dictator bill.’ . . . Congress . . . mounted its own defense of the
Constitution against the arbitrary view of executive power it found so offensive in the
President’s proposal.”).
119. Shesol, supra note 92, at 316.
120. The Federalist No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
121. See David Caute, The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge Under Truman
and Eisenhower 156–57 (1978) (noting Senate Internal Security Subcommittee’s claim
that mid-1950s “Supreme Court decisions ‘have done more for enemy forces and objectives
than might have been accomplished by any other agency or form of paralysis, [sic] short of
the actual overthrow of government’” (quoting Benjamin Ginzburg, Rededication to
Freedom 7 (1959))).
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government’s policies),122 the Court in the mid-1950s issued a series of
decisions that placed constraints on government investigations of suspected communists.123 For example, in Cole v. Young, the Court began to
scrutinize executive agency decisions to discharge allegedly “disloyal” employees.124 And, in Jencks v. United States, the Court required federal prosecutors in criminal cases to turn over all relevant evidence about government witnesses to the defendants (the suspected “subversives”).125
During this period, the nation was led by President Dwight
Eisenhower. Social scientists have described Eisenhower as a “preemptive” president—a moderate conservative who came to power when the
progressive politics of the post-New Deal era were still dominant.126 In
that environment, President Eisenhower was a pragmatic politician who
was “personally sympathetic to conservative Republican ideals” but who
“refused to take on New Deal liberalism” or to be controlled by the right
wing of the Republican Party.127
President Eisenhower likewise took a pragmatic approach to the judiciary. He generally declined to take a strong stand either in favor of or in
opposition to Warren Court civil liberties decisions.128 Instead, President
Eisenhower typically asserted that the federal judiciary was responsible
for making legal decisions, and that his duty as President was to enforce
those decisions, whether or not he agreed with them.129
In keeping with that general approach, President Eisenhower declined to publicly criticize the Supreme Court’s decisions in these “sub122. See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531–32 (1954) (upholding 1950 statute
requiring deportation of members of Communist Party); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524,
541–42 (1952) (upholding mandatory detention, without bail, of alleged Communists
pending deportation); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516–17 (1951) (holding
Smith Act, which made it a crime to advocate overthrow of United States government, did
not “violate the First Amendment [or] other provisions of the Bill of Rights”).
123. See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 214–15 (1957) (holding witnesses
appearing before House Committee on Un-American Activities could, without invoking
Fifth Amendment, refuse to answer some questions); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298,
312 (1957) (reversing convictions of defendants charged with conspiring to organize
Communist Party in violation of Smith Act).
124. 351 U.S. 536, 557–58 (1956) (reversing dismissal of federal employee who was
allegedly associated with subversive organization); see also Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363,
388–89 (1957) (reversing discharge of foreign service officer with alleged ties to
Communist Party).
125. 353 U.S. 657, 672 (1957).
126. Skowronek, supra note 84, at 46; see Whittington, Foundations, supra note 50, at
163 n.2 (agreeing with Skowronek that Eisenhower was a “preemptive” president).
127. Skowronek, supra note 84, at 46.
128. See infra note 130 (describing President Eisenhower’s reticence to publicly
criticize the Supreme Court’s decisions in “subversive activity” cases).
129. See, e.g., President Dwight D. Eisenhower, The President’s News Conference of
August 20, 1958, 1958 Pub. Papers 621, 626 (stating, in response to question about whether
he “personally favor[ed]” the Court’s desegregation decisions, that he “always declined” to
express opinion because he had obligation to enforce Supreme Court’s judgments even if
he “disagree[d] very violently with a decision”).
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versive activity” cases.130 But his administration did not support the
Court’s jurisprudence.131 In several letters to Congress, President
Eisenhower’s first Attorney General Herbert Brownell endorsed legislation to modify the Cole v. Young decision and to give federal agencies
broader authority to terminate “disloyal” employees.132 The DOJ was
even more alarmed by the Jencks ruling. At a hearing, Attorney General
Brownell told Congress that Jencks, at least as interpreted by the lower
federal courts, had created “a grave emergency in law enforcement” and
requested legislation to undo the decision.133
Many members of Congress were more vocal in their criticism.134 In
August 1957, Senator William Jenner introduced a bill to eliminate the
Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction over a range of cases involving
subversive activity.135 He argued that the “so-called Warren Court” had
130. See President Dwight D. Eisenhower, The President’s News Conference of June
26, 1957, 1957 Pub. Papers 497, 503 (stating only that “in their latest series of decisions [in
communism-related cases] there are some that each of us has very great trouble
understanding”). He later referred to these (and criminal justice) decisions when he
remarked that the appointment of Earl Warren was the “biggest mistake” he made as
president. See 2 Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President 190 (1984).
131. Notably, the Eisenhower Administration was quite concerned about the
perceived threat of global communism. See President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Annual
Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, 1957 Pub. Papers 17, 28 (Jan. 10, 1957)
(commenting on “the threat of Soviet aggression”); see also Caute, supra note 121, at 49
(“In his 1954 State of the Union message, Eisenhower himself went so far as to propose
depriving Communists of citizenship.”).
132. The Court’s decisions had permitted such terminations only when an employee
was in a “sensitive” position. The DOJ advocated legislation that would permit the dismissal
of any allegedly “disloyal” employee, at least pending further study. See Federal Employees
Security Program: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Post Office and Civil Serv., 85th
Cong. 140 (1957) (letter from Deputy Att’y Gen. William P. Rogers) (favoring enactment
of bill to overrule Cole v. Young); Bill to Protect the Security of the United States by
Preventing the Employment by the United States of Persons Found to be Disloyal to the
United States: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Post Office and Civil Serv., 84th Cong.
4–5 (1956) (letter from Att’y Gen. Herbert Brownell) (same).
133. Establishing Procedures for the Production of Government Records in Criminal
Cases in United States Courts: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in the Fed.
Criminal Code of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong. 8–9 (1958) (testimony of
Att’y Gen. Herbert Brownell). Congress did later modify Jencks, and the Court upheld that
new law. Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 350–53 & n.11 (1959); see Caute, supra
note 121, at 138 (noting Congress enacted legislation in response to Jencks ruling).
134. See, e.g., 104 Cong. Rec. 18,678 (1958) (statement of Sen. James Oliver
Eastland) (contending Court’s “decisions . . . have effectively destroyed this Nation’s
defense against [the communist] conspiracy”). Other legislators, however, rushed to the
Court’s defense. See, e.g., id. at 18,679–80 (statement of Sen. Jacob Javits) (arguing “the
maintenance of the proper balance between the Constitution and the laws made by
Congress is at least as important as the effort” to root out Communists).
135. See Limitation of Appellate Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court:
Hearing on S. 2646 Before the S. Subcomm. to Investigate the Admin. of the Internal Sec.
Act and Other Internal Sec. Laws of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong. 1–2 (1957)
(statement of Sen. William E. Jenner) (noting bill sought to strip the Court’s appellate
jurisdiction over (1) functions of congressional committees; (2) decisions by executive
agencies to terminate disloyal employees; (3) any state law on subversive activity; (4) any
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done much to “confuse, disarm and paralyze the people in their fight . . .
against the world Communist conspiracy.”136 Indeed, Senator Jenner
complained, the Court had become “so befuddled as to hold” that a federal agency could not remove “a spy” from its employment roles.137 He
declared: “[W]hen [such] things have come to pass, . . . it is time to curtail the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court . . . .”138
The Senate Judiciary Committee conducted hearings on the Jenner
bill and invited Eisenhower’s second Attorney General William Rogers to
comment on the measure.139 Despite the administration’s concerns
about the Court’s decisions, the Eisenhower Justice Department strongly
opposed this jurisdiction-stripping bill. On March 4, 1958, Attorney
General Rogers sent a letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee,
“urg[ing] . . . the committee [to] report the bill adversely.”140 The
Attorney General stated that “[f]ull and unimpaired appellate jurisdiction in the Supreme Court is fundamental under our system of government.”141 He emphasized in part the need for uniformity in the administration of federal law. “If this legislation should be enacted, constitutional
questions . . . would be left for decision to the [various] Federal courts of
appeal and the highest appellate court for each of the 48 States.”142 But
the Attorney General also worried about the effect of the measure on
judicial independence.143 He declared: “I am convinced that [the] enactment [of this bill] would be extremely detrimental to the proper administration of justice and harmful to our balanced system of
government . . . .”144
Following the Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, Senator John
Butler proposed an amended bill that eliminated most of the jurisdic-

school board rule governing subversive activity among teachers; and (5) any state law
pertaining to bar admissions).
136. Id. at 6.
137. Id. at 23.
138. Id.
139. Limitation of Appellate Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court:
Hearing on S. 2646 Before the S. Subcomm. to Investigate the Admin. of the Internal Sec.
Act and Other Internal Sec. Laws of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong. 572–73
(1958) [hereinafter Limitation of Appellate Jurisdiction Hearings 1958].
140. Id. at 574 (letter from Att’y Gen. William P. Rogers to Sen. James O. Eastland,
Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
141. Id. at 573.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 574 (“The natural consequence . . . of such an enactment is that the courts
would operate under the constant apprehension that if they rendered unpopular
decisions, jurisdiction would be further curtailed.”).
144. Id.
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tional restrictions.145 But, ultimately, the Senate rejected this new
“Jenner-Butler bill” in its entirety.146
C. Jurisdiction-Stripping Efforts in the Carter Administration
The number of attacks on the federal judiciary exploded in the late
1970s (during the presidency of Jimmy Carter), largely in response to the
constitutional jurisprudence of the Warren and Burger Courts. There
were dozens of proposals to strip federal jurisdiction over constitutional
claims ranging from school prayer and abortion to the use of busing to
integrate public schools.147
Social scientists have described President Carter as a “disjunctive”
leader who came to power at the tail end of a political era; in his case, it
was the end of the progressive era originally ushered in by Franklin
Roosevelt.148 Like many “disjunctive” leaders, President Carter oversaw a
deeply divided political party. The Democratic Party was split between
social progressives, who favored the Court’s civil rights jurisprudence,
and social conservatives (primarily from the South) who opposed it.149
Thus, President Carter’s greatest challenge was maintaining this fractured coalition.150
145. See 104 Cong. Rec. 18,646–51 (1958) (statement of Sen. John Butler) (“My
amendment strikes out the [jurisdiction-stripping] language . . . leaving the withdrawal of
jurisdiction applicable only in . . . one area . . . .”). The new “Jenner-Butler” bill sought to
remove the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction in only one area—review of state court
decisions on bar admissions. Id. at 18,647. Bar admissions became an area of controversy
after the Court began to review state court decisions denying admission to suspected
communists. See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 273 (1957) (“We recognize the
importance of leaving States free to select their own bars, but it is equally important that
the State not exercise this power in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner nor in such a
way as to impinge on the freedom of political expression or association.”). Notably, the
NAACP was strongly opposed to the elimination of the Court’s appellate jurisdiction in this
area. The organization was concerned that state courts would use that freedom from
Supreme Court supervision to bar civil rights attorneys from practicing law in their states.
See Limitation of Appellate Jurisdiction Hearings 1958, supra note 139, at 486–92
(statement of Clarence Mitchell, Director of the Washington Bureau of the NAACP) (“If
[civil rights opponents] succeed in choking off the court action, having already choked off
other possible avenues of redress, . . . they will effective [sic] prevent people from getting
any kind of redress.”).
146. See 104 Cong. Rec. 18,687 (1958) (showing Senate defeated measure by vote of
49-41).
147. See Edward Keynes & Randall K. Miller, The Court vs. Congress: Prayer, Busing,
and Abortion 195–203, 221–22, 292–98 (1989) (discussing attempts to strip Court’s
jurisdiction over cases relating to school prayer, busing, and abortion, respectively).
148. See Skowronek, supra note 84, at 361–62, 365 (describing “Jimmy Carter’s
Disjunction”—a time when “liberalism was on the defensive”).
149. See Whittington, Foundations, supra note 50, at 66, 268–69 (describing Carter’s
difficulties reconciling differences between Democratic progressives and conservatives on
social issues).
150. See id. at 66 (“Carter faced a particularly daunting task of maintaining an
increasingly frayed party coalition, while also keeping faith with the political image and
concerns that brought him to the presidency in the first place.”).
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Perhaps for this reason, as political scientist Stephen Skowronek has
explained, President Carter gained a reputation for “fuzziness” on controversial issues.151 For example, while President Carter courted the vote
of the religious right in 1976 by emphasizing his own born-again
Christianity, he declined to support their efforts to reinstate prayer in
school.152 Likewise, although Carter declared that he was “personally
against abortion,” he treated the issue as a “legal” matter for the courts to
decide.153 He thus declined to support efforts to ban abortion.154
The Carter Justice Department was, however, somewhat less “fuzzy”
on jurisdiction stripping. In April 1979, while the Senate was considering
a proposal by Senator Jesse Helms to eliminate federal jurisdiction over
school prayer cases,155 Attorney General Griffin Bell sent a letter to
Congress urging them to reject the measure. The Attorney General stated
that any proposal to strip federal jurisdiction over constitutional claims
was “ill-advised as a matter of constitutional law and of public policy,”
because “[m]atters of constitutional interpretation and adjudication
are . . . pre-eminently within the province of the Federal judiciary.”156 But
Bell was especially concerned about the proposed limitation on the
Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction. Although he declined (at that
point) to take a position on Congress’s power to enact such a measure, he
151. Skowronek, supra note 84, at 372 (“[T]he more [Carter] attempted to . . . clarify
his position publicly, the more dissonance people heard, and by the end of the 1976
primary campaign, he was already stamped indelibly with a debilitating reputation for
‘fuzziness.’”).
152. See Andrew R. Flint & Joy Porter, Jimmy Carter: The Re-Emergence of FaithBased Politics and the Abortion Rights Issue, 35 Presidential Stud. Q. 28, 32, 35 (2005)
(asserting “Christian conservatives quickly became disillusioned with the Carter
presidency,” in part because of “his failure to support mandatory prayer in public
schools”).
153. Carter explained that “as President [he took] an oath to uphold the laws . . . as
interpreted by the Supreme Court . . . . So, if the [Court] should rule, as they have, on
abortion and other sensitive issues contrary to [his] own personal beliefs, [he had] to carry
out” that ruling. Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session During a Live Television
Broadcast, 3 Pub. Papers 2348, 2354 (Oct. 20, 1980).
154. See Flint & Porter, supra note 152, at 35 (noting “Christian conservatives quickly
became disillusioned with the Carter presidency,” in part because of “his failure to . . .
move to ban abortion”).
155. See Louis Fisher, Religious Liberty in America: Political Safeguards 130 (2002)
(noting Senator Jesse Helms “took the lead in promoting this type of court-stripping bill”).
The bill provided:
[T]he Supreme Court shall not have jurisdiction to review, by appeal, writ of
certiorari, or otherwise, any case arising out of any State [law] . . . which relates to
voluntary prayers in public schools and public buildings. . . . [T]he district courts
shall not have jurisdiction of any case or question which the Supreme Court does
not have the jurisdiction to review under [the above provision].
125 Cong. Rec. 7577 (1979).
156. Letter from Griffin B. Bell, Att’y Gen., to Hon. Abraham Ribicoff, Chairman,
Comm. on Gov’t Operations, U.S. Senate (April 9, 1979), in 125 Cong. Rec. 7636–37
(1979). Although Attorney General Bell’s letter specifically addressed the school prayer
bill, his analysis was not limited to that proposal. See id.
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made clear that any such law would be unwise. The elimination of
Supreme Court review would “run afoul of the public interest in . . . a
uniform, definitive and dispositive nation-wide resolution of issues of constitutional magnitude.”157
The Senate ultimately passed the jurisdiction-stripping bill, and the
measure went to the House Judiciary Committee.158 The Carter Justice
Department then provided its views on the constitutionality of the proposal. As Assistant Attorney General John Harmon explained at a subcommittee hearing, the DOJ believed that the school prayer measure was “unconstitutional to the extent that it would purport to divest the Supreme
Court of . . . jurisdiction.”159
The Carter Justice Department endorsed Professor Hart’s “essential
role” theory and concluded that it would be “difficult to conceive of a
more essential role for the Court than to preserve the unity of our constitutional law.”160 Accordingly, the school prayer proposal was “unconstitutional because it impinge[d] on the essential role of the Supreme
Court.”161 Harmon declared that he was “confident” the DOJ would recommend that President Carter “veto” any bill containing such a jurisdiction-stripping provision.162
The school prayer bill ultimately died in the House Judiciary
Committee.163 No other jurisdiction-stripping bill made it to the floor of
either the House or the Senate during the Carter Administration. But
legislators continued to propose such bills after President Carter left office in 1981.164

157. Id. at 7637.
158. 125 Cong. Rec. 7657 (1979).
159. Prayer in Public Schools and Buildings—Federal Court Jurisdiction: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 14 (1980) (Department of Justice memorandum for
Assistant Att’y Gen. Alan A. Parker); see id. at 19–20 (statement of John Harmon, Assistant
Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice) (“[T]he exception that
would be created by the enactment of the ‘school prayer amendment’ . . . would violate the
supremacy clause of the Constitution, article VI, clause 2, and therefore would be
unconstitutional.”).
160. Id. at 16–17 (Department of Justice memorandum for Assistant Att’y Gen. Alan
A. Parker).
161. Id. at 17.
162. Id. at 23 (statement of John Harmon, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice).
163. Keynes & Miller, supra note 147, at 200.
164. See id. at 195–203, 221–25, 292–98 (discussing attempts to strip Court’s
jurisdiction over cases relating to school prayer, busing, and abortion, respectively); Max
Baucus & Kenneth R. Kay, The Court Stripping Bills: Their Impact on the Constitution,
the Courts, and Congress, 27 Vill. L. Rev. 988, 992–94 (1982) (recounting efforts to strip
federal jurisdiction over abortion, busing, and school prayer in early 1980s).
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D. The Reagan Era: Continuing Opposition to Jurisdiction Stripping
Social scientists have described Ronald Reagan as the most recent
“reconstructive” leader.165 President Reagan articulated a new economic
and social policy that differed sharply from the politics of the progressive
leaders in the post-New Deal era. He sought to redefine the role of the
federal government by reducing government regulation of the economy
and enhancing the powers of the several states.166
President Reagan also articulated a more socially conservative stance
on constitutional issues. He was deeply skeptical of the civil rights jurisprudence of the Warren and Burger Courts. Thus, throughout his presidency, Reagan strongly criticized the Supreme Court’s decisions on
school prayer, busing, and abortion.167 For example, President Reagan
“express[ed] profound disappointment” with the Court’s abortion decisions and “call[ed] on the Congress to make its voice heard against abortion on demand . . . whether by statute or constitutional amendment.”168
Likewise, Reagan asserted that “the decision that prevented voluntary
prayer by anyone who wanted to do so in a school or a public building is
just not in keeping with the Constitution at all.”169
The Reagan Justice Department actively promoted the President’s
pledge for a new and more socially conservative constitutional jurisprudence.170 Reagan’s first Attorney General William French Smith denounced the federal courts’ “activist” constitutional rulings.171 During his
tenure, the DOJ (through Solicitor General Rex Lee) urged the Court to
moderate its school prayer jurisprudence.172 And Reagan’s second
Attorney General Ed Meese challenged not only the Court’s decisions but
judicial supremacy itself. Thus, Meese articulated a departmentalist view
of constitutional interpretation, arguing that if the President believed the
165. See, e.g., Skowronek, supra note 84, at 414–15 (discussing President Reagan’s
“reconstructive posture”).
166. See id. at 415 (noting Reagan promised to “releas[e] the creative energies of the
private sector” by deregulating business); Whittington, Foundations, supra note 50, at 275
(“Central to Reagan’s constitutional vision was a more limited national government.”).
167. See Remarks at a Reagan-Bush Rally in Charlotte, N.C., 2 Pub. Papers 1465, 1466
(Oct. 8, 1984) (“[B]using . . . takes innocent children out of the neighborhood school and
makes them pawns in a social experiment that nobody wants. We’ve found out it failed.”).
168. Statement on the United States Supreme Court Decision on Abortion, 1 Pub.
Papers 876, 876 (June 16, 1983).
169. Interview with Eleanor Clift, Jack Nelson, and Joel Havemann of the Los Angeles
Times, 1 Pub. Papers 825, 830 (June 23, 1986) [hereinafter Clift Interview].
170. See Rebecca Mae Salokar, The Solicitor General: The Politics of Law 76 (1992)
(noting Reagan Administration “coined a new term in . . . the solicitor general’s office,
‘agenda cases,’” which included cases involving abortion, prayer, and busing).
171. Lincoln Caplan, The Tenth Justice: The Solicitor General and the Rule of Law
66–67 (1987); see also Nancy V. Baker, Conflicting Loyalties: Law and Politics in the
Attorney General’s Office, 1789–1990, at 170 (1992) (stating Attorney General Smith
“share[d] the policy agenda of the [Reagan] administration”).
172. See Fisher, supra note 155, at 133 (noting Reagan Administration asked Court to
“take a fresh look” at school prayer decisions (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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federal courts erred in their constitutional judgments, he had a responsibility to advance his opposing view.173 During Meese’s tenure, the Justice
Department advanced the President’s view on abortion when it (through
Solicitor General Charles Fried) filed amicus briefs expressly calling for
the reversal of Roe v. Wade.174
In this environment, one might have expected the Reagan
Administration to favor efforts to strip federal jurisdiction, at least in the
areas of jurisprudence that the President had so roundly criticized.175 But
the Reagan Justice Department took the same basic approach as its predecessors. Attorney General Smith explained the DOJ’s position in a May
1982 letter to Congress (which he separately published as an official
Office of Legal Counsel opinion).176
Attorney General Smith asserted that Congress lacked the power to
strip the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction over constitutional claims.177 He
acknowledged that, under the plain language of the Exceptions Clause,
there was “no doubt that Congress possesses some power to regulate the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.”178 But he insisted that
“Congress may not . . . consistent with the Constitution, make ‘exceptions’ to Supreme Court jurisdiction which would intrude upon [its] core
functions . . . as an independent and equal branch in our system of separation of powers.”179
Smith further argued that, even if Congress had the power to eliminate the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction, it should not do so. He
emphasized the importance of the Supreme Court in preserving the uniformity and supremacy of federal law, declaring that “[t]he integrity of
173. See Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 Tul. L. Rev. 979, 985–86
(1987).
174. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants at 2,
Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (Nos. 84495, 84-1379), 1985 WL 669620 at *2 (asserting “Roe v. Wade is so far flawed . . . that this
Court should reconsider that decision and . . . abandon it”).
175. Legislators continued to propose bills involving abortion, school prayer, and
busing. See Keynes & Miller, supra note 147, at 195–203, 221–25, 292–98 (discussing
attempts to strip Court’s jurisdiction over cases relating to school prayer, busing, and
abortion, respectively); see also Laurence H. Tribe, Jurisdictional Gerrymandering: Zoning
Disfavored Rights Out of the Federal Courts, 16 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 129, 149 (1981)
(noting one abortion bill sought to eliminate both Supreme Court and lower federal court
jurisdiction).
176. See 128 Cong. Rec. 9093, 9093–97 (1982) (letter from William French Smith,
Att’y Gen., to Sen. Strom Thurmond, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (explaining
DOJ’s position that Congress may not withdraw jurisdiction on public prayer issues
completely from federal courts); Constitutionality of Legislation Withdrawing Supreme
Court Jurisdiction to Consider Cases Relating to Voluntary Prayer, 6 Op. O.L.C. 13, 13–26
(1982) (same).
177. Although Attorney General Smith’s letter specifically addressed a school prayer
provision, he did not limit his analysis to such a proposal. See 128 Cong. Rec. at 9093–97.
178. Id. at 9093.
179. Id.
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our system of federal law depends upon a single court of last resort having a final say on the resolution of federal questions.”180
Attorney General Meese endorsed these statements during his confirmation hearings.181 Senator Max Baucus asked him about measures “to
limit the Supreme Court[’s] jurisdiction over, say, school prayer, busing,
abortion, the right to bear arms, any provision that is contained in the
Constitution . . . .”182 Meese stated that he agreed with his predecessor
that Congress lacks the power to “diminish or take away the core functions of the Supreme Court,” including the power to rule on constitutional claims.183 Meese declared that if he believed that a bill infringed
on “a core function of the Supreme Court,” then he “would recommend
a veto.”184
The Reagan Justice Department also opposed bills that would eliminate inferior federal court jurisdiction over constitutional claims.185
Attorney General Meese explained that, although Congress “has a greater
latitude” over lower court jurisdiction, it would be unwise for Congress to
exercise that power.186 The judicial system could become very unstable if
Congress “chang[ed] . . . jurisdiction based upon what may be in vogue at
a particular time.”187 Thus, he believed that, as a general rule, Congress
should not “limit lower Federal court jurisdiction over a Federal constitutional question.”188
180. Id. at 9097 (asserting “[s]tate courts could reach disparate conclusions on
identical questions of federal law” and that, absent Supreme Court oversight, there would
be “no guarantee . . . that state courts [would] accord appropriate supremacy to federal
law”).
181. See Nomination of Edwin Meese III: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 98th Cong. 185–86 (1984) [hereinafter Meese Nomination Hearing].
182. Id. at 185 (statement of Sen. Max Baucus, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
183. Id. at 185 (statement of Edwin Meese III) (stating such measure “would be
unwise as well as impermissible under the Constitution”).
184. Id. at 186.
185. See Limitations on Court-Ordered Busing—Neighborhood School Act: Hearing
on S. 951 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 166 (1982) (statement of Theodore B. Olson,
Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice) (stating DOJ
recommended against proposals that would “take classes of cases out of the jurisdiction” of
lower federal courts). The Reagan Administration took a more nuanced view of what it saw
as proposals to limit the lower federal courts’ remedial power, supporting a proposal to
restrict their authority to order busing in school desegregation cases. See id. at 131–34.
But, notably, the DOJ interpreted the measure so as to exempt the Supreme Court. See id.
at 133–34. In the DOJ’s view, the validity of the busing measure would be “far more
debatable” if it applied to the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction. Id. at 134.
186. Meese Nomination Hearing, supra note 181, at 185 (statement of Edwin Meese
III).
187. Id.
188. Id. Meese expressed this view in response to a question from Senator Baucus:
Senator Baucus. So, as I understand your answer, then, you think it is clearly
unconstitutional for Congress to attempt to prevent the Supreme Court from
having jurisdiction over a Federal constitutional question and that it is probably
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Given President Reagan’s declarations that the Supreme Court’s civil
rights jurisprudence was “just not in keeping with the Constitution at all”
(views that were shared by his Attorneys General),189 the Reagan Justice
Department’s opposition to jurisdiction-stripping legislation seems remarkable. Yet there may be no inconsistency. The Reagan Justice
Department had an alternative way of addressing what it viewed as the
Supreme Court’s constitutional errors.
As Attorney General Smith explained in his May 1982 letter, the DOJ
sought to “remedy . . . judicial overreaching,” not by restricting federal
jurisdiction, but instead by challenging the courts’ constitutional rulings
through litigation.190 Likewise, Meese argued that one of the best ways
for the President to express his alternative constitutional vision was
through litigation.191 “A lawsuit . . . can help clarify the law by better
defining its edges. It can also give the Court an opportunity for rethinking a previous holding.”192 President Reagan indicated his support for
this approach, when he declared that “[i]n many areas—abortion, crime,
pornography, and others—progress will take place [only] when the
Federal judiciary is made up of judges who believe in law and order and a
strict interpretation of the Constitution” and promised to nominate federal judges “who share[d] the fundamental values” of his
administration.193
Thus, much like his reconstructive predecessor during the New Deal,
President Reagan had little reason to favor restrictions on federal jurisdiction.194 He sought (over time, of course) to “pack” the Supreme Court
and the lower federal courts with judges who would be sympathetic to his
unwise for Congress to attempt to limit lower Federal court jurisdiction over a
Federal constitutional question.
Mr. Meese. I would say as a general rule, yes, Senator. Obviously as to the latter
part, the lower Federal courts, it would depend clearly on the specific case, the
specific subject, and the specific proposal.
Id.
189. Clift Interview, supra note 169, at 830; see supra notes 167–174 and
accompanying text (describing Reagan Administration’s stances on civil rights and
constitutional issues).
190. 128 Cong. Rec. 9093–94 (1982) (letter from William French Smith, Att’y Gen.,
Dep’t of Justice, to Sen. Strom Thurmond, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (“The
Department of Justice will continue, through its litigating efforts, to urge the courts not to
intrude into areas that properly belong to the State legislatures and to Congress.”).
191. See Edwin Meese III, The Tulane Speech: What I Meant, 61 Tul. L. Rev. 1003,
1006–07 (1987) [hereinafter Meese, Speech] (“A lawsuit thus can help clarify the law by
better defining its edges.”).
192. Id. at 1006.
193. Remarks by Telephone to the Annual Convention of the Knights of Columbus in
Chicago, Illinois, 2 Pub. Papers 1053, 1055 (Aug. 5, 1986); see Goldman, supra note 52, at
285 (arguing Reagan, like Roosevelt, “self-consciously attempted to use the power of
judicial appointment to place on the bench judges who shared [his] general philosophy”).
194. See supra notes 109–115 and accompanying text (describing Roosevelt’s courtpacking plan).
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constitutional vision.195 The Reagan Justice Department could then use
litigation to “give [this new judiciary] an opportunity for rethinking a previous holding.”196 In short, much like President Roosevelt, Reagan sought
to “harness the power of the [federal judiciary], not destroy it.”197
As this historical survey demonstrates, the executive branch has repeatedly used its constitutional authority in the legislative process to oppose legislation targeted at the Supreme Court’s appellate review power
or at federal jurisdiction over constitutional claims. During the Roosevelt
era, legislators waited for the President to recommend “[m]easures [that]
he . . . judge[d] necessary and expedient”198 to address the “problem”
created by the Supreme Court’s rejection of New Deal legislation. The
Roosevelt Administration used this authority to reject jurisdictionstripping proposals and to suggest an alternative that would have been
more beneficial to the executive branch. In later years, the Carter and
Reagan Justice Departments explicitly invoked the threat of a presidential
veto.
Furthermore, this historical evidence indicates that the DOJ’s preference for Supreme Court review is reinforced by the executive branch’s
interest in the uniform enforcement of federal law. It is extremely expensive and administratively cumbersome if state court or lower federal court
decisions require the federal government to enforce federal law differently in different regions of the country.199 Perhaps for this reason, the
Carter Justice Department underscored the need for Supreme Court review to protect “the public interest in . . . a uniform, definitive and dispositive nation-wide resolution of issues of constitutional magnitude.”200
Likewise, the Reagan Administration warned that, absent Supreme Court
oversight, “[s]tate courts could reach disparate conclusions on identical
questions of federal law” and declared that “[t]he integrity of our system
of federal law depends upon a single court of last resort having a final say
on the resolution of federal questions.”201
Accordingly, various administrations—with vastly different views of
and approaches to the federal judiciary—have found it in their interest to
protect the scope of federal jurisdiction. The executive branch has thus
195. See supra notes 185–188 and accompanying text (describing Reagan
Administration’s advocacy of broad lower federal court jurisdiction for constitutional
issues).
196. Meese, Speech, supra note 191, at 1006.
197. Whittington, Foundations, supra note 50, at 267.
198. U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.
199. Indeed, the government often seeks certiorari on this basis. See, e.g., Brief for
the United States at 11, Lockhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 142 (2005) (No. 04-881), 2005
WL 460918, at *11 (arguing “[t]his Court’s review is warranted to resolve [a] direct circuit
conflict, which prevents the uniform administration of . . . the federal student loan
program”).
200. 125 Cong. Rec. 7637 (1979) (letter from Att’y Gen. Griffin B. Bell).
201. 128 Cong. Rec. 9097 (1982) (letter from Att’y Gen. William French Smith).
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proven, in the legislative process, to be an important ally for the federal
courts.
III. ARTICLE II SAFEGUARDS

IN

LITIGATION

The executive branch has repeatedly opposed jurisdiction-stripping
bills, and most such proposals have been killed in the legislative process.
The executive branch’s opposition has not, however, been absolute. Instead, in recent decades (as discussed further in Part IV), some
jurisdiction-stripping measures have been enacted into law with the President’s assent.
But, even after a bill becomes law, the executive branch has a second
constitutional tool to protect the federal judiciary. Under the Take Care
Clause of Article II, the executive branch maintains control over the enforcement of that law.202 The Justice Department has often used this authority to urge narrow constructions of jurisdiction-stripping measures in
order to preserve the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction and federal
jurisdiction over constitutional claims.
A. Construing Limits on the Supreme Court’s Appellate Jurisdiction
As David Cole has observed, the political branches in 1996 “broke
the taboo” on jurisdiction-stripping legislation with the enactment of several statutes, including the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA)203—a law that completely overhauled federal habeas litigation.204 Notably, AEDPA was enacted with the strong support of President
Bill Clinton. Social scientists have described Clinton as a “preemptive”
president, who came to power when the conservative era ushered in by
President Reagan was still dominant.205 Like many preemptive leaders,
Clinton adopted a “hybrid” form of politics that integrated the views of
both progressives and moderate conservatives.206 Clinton’s support for
202. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 3 (“[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed . . . .”).
203. David Cole, Jurisdiction and Liberty: Habeas Corpus and Due Process as Limits
on Congress’s Control of Federal Jurisdiction, 86 Geo. L.J. 2481, 2482 & n.7 (1998); see
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
204. AEDPA curtailed the scope of federal habeas review of state criminal convictions
and significantly cut back on multiple habeas filings. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2254 (2006)
(laying out rules to govern habeas review).
205. See Skowronek, supra note 84, at 449 (asserting Clinton “lack[ed] the authority
to challenge fundamentally the terms in which legitimate national government ha[d]
come to be understood in the post-Reagan era,” and “[h]is leadership [was] preemptive
rather than reconstructive”); Whittington, Foundations, supra note 50, at 163 & n.2
(agreeing with Skowronek that Clinton was a “preemptive” president).
206. See Skowronek, supra note 84, at 449, 451 (arguing “[t]he distinctive thing about
preemptive leaders is that they are not out to establish, uphold, or salvage any political
orthodoxy . . . . These leaders bid openly for a hybrid alternative,” and arguing Clinton’s
label of “‘New’ Democrats” illustrated this “hybrid” approach).
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anticrime legislation was central to this hybrid approach.207 Thus, in signing AEDPA into law, President Clinton expressed support for many of the
habeas reforms, stating that he had “long sought to streamline Federal
appeals” in capital cases.208 He did not, however, comment on the
jurisdiction-stripping provisions in AEDPA.
One of those provisions restricts the Supreme Court’s appellate review power. AEDPA requires an inmate to obtain leave from a federal
court of appeals before filing a second (or successive) habeas petition
and provides that “[t]he grant or denial of [such] an authorization . . .
shall not be appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition . . . for a
writ of certiorari.”209
Soon after the enactment of AEDPA, a capital defendant in Georgia
(Ellis Wayne Felker) challenged this provision. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari, ordered expedited briefing and argument, and invited
the Solicitor General to file a brief “expressing the views of the United
States.”210 The Court directed the parties to address the following issues:
(1) Whether [the appellate review provision of AEDPA] . . . is an
unconstitutional restriction of the jurisdiction of this Court. (2)
Whether and to what extent [the provision applies] to petitions
for habeas corpus filed as original matters in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.211
In the litigation, the parties seemed to agree that AEPDA restricted
the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction in one respect. The statute
prevented the Court from entertaining a direct appeal from a prisoner
who was denied leave to file a successive habeas petition.212 The primary
issue of contention was whether the statute cut off all avenues to the
Court and, if so, whether such a limitation was constitutional. Thus, the
debate centered on whether AEDPA should be read to prevent a habeas
petitioner from filing an “original” petition in the Supreme Court under
28 U.S.C. § 2241. (The Court had long treated such habeas petitions as

207. See id. at 455 (“Clinton, determined to erase any doubt that a Democrat could
be tough on crime, endorsed provisions for the death penalty [and] for stiffer . . .
sentencing.”); Whittington, Foundations, supra note 50, at 5, 206–07 (stating Clinton
“buil[t] a domestic policy record on such traditionally Republican issues as deficit
reduction, crime fighting, and welfare reform”).
208. Statement on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,
1 Pub. Papers 630, 631 (Apr. 24, 1996).
209. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E).
210. Felker v. Turpin, 517 U.S. 1182, 1183 (1996). The Solicitor General treats such
an “invitation” as a directive from the Court. Pacelle, supra note 69, at 45.
211. Felker, 517 U.S. at 1182–83. The Court also instructed the parties to address
whether the Act violated the Suspension Clause of Article I, section 9. Id. at 1183.
212. See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioner at 11–12, Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996)
(No. 95-8836), 1996 WL 272389, at *11–*12 [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner, Felker]
(arguing prisoner lacks “recourse . . . in this Court on ordinary certiorari review”).
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part of its appellate jurisdiction, but such petitions were nonetheless
known as “original” writs.213)
The State of Georgia argued that the statute cut off all avenues to the
Supreme Court. Accordingly, when an appellate court refused to authorize a successive petition, a prisoner could not seek further review.214 The
State’s position was supported by an amicus brief filed by a bipartisan
group of legislators, including the Senate sponsor of AEDPA.215 The legislators asserted that Congress had ample power to eliminate the Court’s
appellate jurisdiction over this class of habeas cases.216 They further emphasized that one of the principal purposes of AEDPA was to reduce the
delay caused by multiple appeals of state convictions.217 That purpose
would be undermined if the Court permitted successive habeas petitions
to be filed as original writs.218 Indeed, “[i]nterpreting § 2241 in that manner would nullify the gatekeeper provision of the Antiterrorism Act.”219
By contrast, Felker (supported by several amici) urged the Supreme
Court to construe the appellate review restriction narrowly so as to preserve its original habeas jurisdiction.220 Felker argued that, if the statute
were construed “to bar all review by this Court . . . it [would be] unconstitutional,” because it would impermissibly undermine the Court’s “essential role.”221
213. See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 100–01 (1807) (concluding
“original” habeas action was exercise of Court’s appellate jurisdiction because it involved
“revis[ing] [the] decision of an inferior court”). One might argue that, given this
interpretation, the plain text of the statute—that a lower court gatekeeping decision “shall
not be appealable”—barred “original” habeas actions. 28 U.S.C § 2244(b)(3)(E). But no
party made that precise argument.
214. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Felker, 518 U.S. 651 (No. 95-8836)
(“QUESTION: So that means—I mean, the practical effect of [your argument], the[n], is
that our original jurisdiction is, in fact, gone. MS. BOLEYN: Yes.”).
215. See Brief for Senator Orrin G. Hatch et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent at 3, Felker, 518 U.S. 651 (No. 95-8836), 1996 WL 277110, at *3 (“Th[e] Court
should not construe [AEDPA] as allowing petitioner to file a habeas petition to seek review
of the judgment below . . . .”); id. at 2 (“Amicus Orrin Hatch was the primary sponsor . . . in
the Senate . . . .”).
216. See id. at 15 (arguing “Congress can modify appellate jurisdiction granted to this
Court in habeas cases” (citing Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869))).
217. See id. at 4, 22–25 (stating Congress was “frustrated by lengthy delays in the
execution of validly imposed capital sentences” and arguing “repetitive challenges to a
prisoner’s conviction or sentence have become the norm in capital cases”).
218. See id. at 29 (arguing courts of appeals’ gatekeeping decisions are meant to be
“final” and thus “it makes no sense to conclude that this Court” may still review such
actions under § 2241).
219. Id. at 29.
220. Brief for Petitioner, Felker, supra note 212, at 10–12; see, e.g., Brief Amicus
Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Georgia in Support of
Petitioner at 5, Felker, 518 U.S. 651 (No. 95-8836) (contending “nothing in the language of
the new Act even purports to limit this Court’s jurisdiction over habeas actions under 28
U.S.C. § 2241”).
221. See Brief for Petitioner, Felker, supra note 212, at 8, 26.
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The DOJ (through Solicitor General Drew Days) likewise urged the
Supreme Court to construe the jurisdictional limitation narrowly to permit original habeas petitions under § 2241.222 In its brief, the government discussed in detail the academic debate over Congress’s power to
limit the Court’s jurisdiction.223 Although the DOJ declined to take a
firm position on that debate in Felker,224 it did note that Attorney General
Smith had endorsed the “essential role” theory.225 The government declared that it was unnecessary for the Court to resolve that “difficult and
important constitutional issue[ ],” because AEDPA complied with all “the
prevailing theories” of Congress’s power over federal jurisdiction.226 The
DOJ emphasized that the statute (narrowly construed) was consistent
with the “essential role” theory because it left open an avenue for the
Court “to serve as expositor of the federal constitutional rules governing
criminal prosecutions.”227
The Supreme Court ultimately adopted that narrow construction. In
Felker v. Turpin, the Court declared that, although AEDPA prohibited a
direct appeal from a lower court “gatekeeping” decision, it had “not repealed [the Court’s] authority to entertain original habeas petitions.”228
While this “reservation of authority” may have seemed at the time like a
fairly empty gesture (since the Court had not granted an original habeas
petition in decades),229 recent events have demonstrated the importance
of this protection. In August 2009, the Court in In re Davis granted an
original petition in a capital case and directed the federal district court to
consider the inmate’s claim of actual innocence.230
222. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 11–12, Felker, 518 U.S. 651
(No. 95-8836) [hereinafter Brief for United States, Felker] (“Title I of the Act . . . does not
divest this Court of its jurisdiction to entertain original petitions for habeus corpus.”).
223. See id. at 24–27 (stating “legislative consideration of various jurisdictionstripping proposals . . . has precipitated considerable scholarly discussion,” and asserting
“[u]nder any of the prevailing theories, Title I of the Act is constitutional”).
224. Notably, any such position would undermine the Solicitor General’s ability to
defend the constitutionality of AEDPA, if the Supreme Court rejected its narrow
interpretation.
225. See Brief for United States, Felker, supra note 222, at 25–26 (“[S]cholars . . . have
argued that Congress may not . . . prevent the Court from performing its ‘core’ or
‘essential’ functions . . . . That view was more recently articulated by then-Attorney General
William French Smith.”).
226. Id. at 13.
227. Id. at 26.
228. 518 U.S. at 660–61.
229. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. et al., Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the
Federal System 271, 298–99 (6th ed. 2009) (noting narrowness of standards for issuing
original writs and rarity of such issuances).
230. In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1, 1 (2009). On remand, the district court held that Davis
failed to establish innocence by clear and convincing evidence. See In re Davis, No. CV40910, 2010 WL 3385081, at *1 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 24, 2010). Davis’s appeal of that ruling was
denied, see Davis v. Terry, 625 F.3d 716, 719 (11th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1787
(2011), and he was ultimately executed. See Kim Severson, Georgia Inmate Executed;
Raised Racial Issue in Death Penalty, N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 2011, at A1.
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The Solicitor General’s position may not, of course, have necessarily
led the Supreme Court to adopt this narrow construction of AEDPA. But
the government’s approach did assure the Court that, if it were inclined
to interpret the restriction narrowly, that interpretation would have the
support of a coequal branch of the federal government.
B. Federal Jurisdiction over Constitutional Claims
The Justice Department has also urged the courts to construe legislation narrowly in order to preserve federal jurisdiction over at least constitutional claims. This practice (much like the government’s position in
Felker) invites the federal courts to avoid potentially difficult constitutional questions about the scope of Congress’s power over federal
jurisdiction.
1. Early Examples: The Johnson, Nixon, and Reagan Justice Departments.
— Prior to 1996, Congress enacted few statutes that were widely viewed as
“jurisdiction-stripping” laws. But many of the same issues did arise in the
context of judicial review of federal administrative action. The following
examples illustrate both the promise—and the limitations—of the Article
II safeguards in litigation.
The scope of federal jurisdiction became salient during the Vietnam
War era, when various individuals challenged their eligibility for the
draft. For example, in Oestereich v. Selective Service Board, a divinity school
student argued that, under the relevant statutes, he was exempt from military service and that the local selective service agency had called him up
solely to punish him for protesting the war.231 He filed suit, alleging violations of both the statute and his free speech rights under the First
Amendment, seeking to enjoin his induction into military service.232
A provision of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967, however,
seemed to foreclose the lawsuit. The statute provided: “No judicial review
shall be made of the classification or processing of any registrant by local
boards, appeal boards, or the President, except as a defense to a criminal
prosecution.”233
During both the Johnson and the Nixon Administrations, the DOJ
(through Solicitor General Erwin Griswold) argued for a narrow construction of this provision.234 The DOJ noted that the statute appeared to
231. Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 233, 234–35 (1968).
The statute did, in fact, exempt the student from immediate military service. See id. at 234
n.1 (“‘Regular or duly ordained ministers of religion . . . and students preparing for the
ministry . . . shall be exempt from training and service (but not from registration) under
this title.’” (quoting Military Selective Service Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-40, § 6(g), 81
Stat. 100 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. § 456 (g) (2006)))).
232. Id. at 234–35.
233. Military Selective Service Act § 8(c), 81 Stat. at 104 (emphasis added).
234. See Brief for the Respondents at 13–14 & n.7, Fein v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local
Bd. No. 7, 405 U.S. 365 (1972) (No. 70-58) (arguing Congress intended to preserve habeas
remedy “to test the validity of induction”).
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permit review only in the context of a criminal proceeding.235 But the law
would thereby leave a jurisdictional gap: anyone who submitted to induction (and, thus, committed no crime) would have no avenue for judicial
review.
The DOJ asserted that the statute should not be construed to preclude judicial oversight in such cases. The government argued that, “despite [its] sweeping language . . . this provision is subject to an exception
or qualification in that review may be had, after induction, not only
through a criminal prosecution but also by habeas corpus.”236 The government acknowledged that “no such qualification is stated in the sweeping language of the statute.”237 Indeed, habeas petitions would “surely
[be] a means of ‘judicial review’ other than by ‘criminal prosecution.’”238
But there was some evidence in the legislative history that Congress had
not intended to preclude the preexisting scheme of habeas review.239
Moreover, the DOJ noted, this narrow construction was necessary to
“avoid the constitutional problem that would arise if the statute were construed to bar habeas corpus.”240
The Justice Department also urged the Court to create an even
broader exception for an individual like Oestereich with a strong constitutional and statutory challenge to induction.241 The DOJ recommended
that, in such a case, the Court should permit immediate review under 28
U.S.C. § 1331.242 (This latter concession was especially remarkable because Congress had enacted the jurisdictional restriction largely to over-

235. See Brief for the Respondents at 22 & n.7, Oestereich, 393 U.S. 233 (No. 46)
[hereinafter Brief for Respondents, Oestereich] (arguing, although provision “does not
explicitly preserve the habeas corpus remedy,” it “expressly provides for review after . . .
induction,” and “such review could only be by habeas corpus”).
236. Id. at 60 (emphasis in original).
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. See id. at 22 n.7, 60 (explaining “[t]he legislative history of Section 10(b)(3)
shows that Congress intended to preserve the generally prevailing law with respect to
judicial review of Selective Service classifications”). The legislative history indicated that
Congress sought to preclude only pre-induction review. See H.R. Rep. No. 90-267, at 30
(1967) (“The committee was disturbed by the apparent inclination of some courts to
review the classification action of local . . . boards before the registrant had exhausted his
administrative remedies.”).
240. Brief for Respondents, Oestereich, supra note 235, at 60; see id. at 22 n.7 (stating if
law barred habeas review, it might violate Suspension Clause).
241. See id. at 62–66 (“It is enough here to conclude that the statutory provisions
involved can best be reconciled by permitting petitioner to maintain a pre-induction
suit . . . in view of the whole complex of factors here . . . including . . . the constitutional
doubts which might be raised on these particular facts.”).
242. See id. at 13–14, 66 (explaining “the statutory provisions involved can best be
reconciled by permitting petitioner to maintain a pre-induction suit”).
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turn a court of appeals decision allowing such pre-induction review,243
and because the Selective Service itself opposed such review.244)
The Supreme Court agreed with the Justice Department’s construction. The Court noted that “[n]o one . . . suggests that [the Act] can
sustain a literal reading. For while it purports on its face to suspend the
writ of habeas corpus . . . everyone agrees that such was not its intent.”245
The Court thus held that the statute was “unambiguous” in permitting
“judicial review . . . in a criminal prosecution or, as the Government concedes, [via] habeas corpus after induction.”246 The Court further held
that, in exceptional cases like Oestereich, the plaintiff could seek immediate relief in district court under § 1331.247
In Webster v. Doe, by contrast, the DOJ argued that the relevant statutes foreclosed all judicial review of administrative action.248 Webster in243. See Wolff v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 16, 372 F.2d 817, 820 (2d Cir. 1967)
(finding “the threat to First Amendment rights is of such immediate and irreparable
consequence . . . as to require prompt action by the courts”); see also Ralph Reisner, The
Conscientious Objector Exemption: Administrative Procedures and Judicial Review, 35 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 686, 704 (1968) (noting after court in Wolff permitted a pre-enforcement suit
by two student war protesters, “Congress attempted to nullify even this narrow exception”
for cases with “free speech and association implications, in the 1967 Act”).
244. The DOJ separately presented the agency’s views in the government’s brief. See
Brief for Respondents, Oestereich, supra note 235, at 7, 66–74.
245. Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 233, 238 (1968).
246. Id. at 235; see Fein v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 7, 405 U.S. 365, 374–75
(1972) (adopting same construction).
247. See Oestereich, 393 U.S. at 237–39 (holding “petitioner must have the opportunity
to . . . demonstrate that he meets the jurisdictional requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1331”).
248. 486 U.S. 592 (1988). That was also true in Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361
(1974). In Johnson, the plaintiff, a conscientious objector who had performed “alternative
civilian service” during the Vietnam War, sought veterans’ benefits to pay for law school.
Id. at 362–64. Under the statute, such benefits were available only to those who had served
on active duty, so the Veterans Administration denied his claim. See id. at 363–64. The
plaintiff filed suit, challenging this statutory limitation on equal protection and free
exercise grounds. See id. at 364. The relevant statute provided:
[T]he decisions of the Administrator on any question of law or fact under any law
administered by the Veterans’ Administration . . . shall be final and conclusive
and no . . . court of the United States shall have power or jurisdiction to review
any such decision by an action in the nature of mandamus or otherwise.
Id. at 365 n.5 (quoting provision in effect at that time).
In Johnson and a companion case, the Nixon Justice Department argued that this
provision precluded federal jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s constitutional claims. Brief for
the Appellants at 21–28, Johnson, 415 U.S. 361 (No. 72-1297) [hereinafter Brief for
Appellants, Johnson]; see Brief for the Respondents at 9, Hernandez v. Veterans’ Admin.,
415 U.S. 391 (1974) (No. 72-700) (arguing “even prior to its amendment in 1970, Section
211(a) would have barred judicial review of petitioners’ constitutional contentions”). But
the DOJ emphasized the limited nature of its argument. Congress could limit jurisdiction
over a constitutional claim only in a case involving government benefits, not one involving
regulatory authority. See id. at 9-10 & n.4 (arguing limitation of judicial review is
permissible “when administrative action involves no assertion of power over an individual,
either to compel his compliance with a duty or to deprive him of liberty or property”); see
also Brief for Appellants, Johnson, supra, at 27 (“The Administrator’s action involved no
present or potential exercise of governmental power against appellee; it merely withheld
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volved a suit by a former employee of the Central Intelligence Agency
who was allegedly terminated for security reasons.249 The plaintiff employee asserted that he was instead fired because he had informed his
supervisor that he was gay.250 He brought suit under the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), challenging his termination on both statutory and
constitutional grounds.251
The Reagan Justice Department (through Solicitor General Charles
Fried) argued that the courts lacked jurisdiction even over Doe’s constitutional claims.252 The DOJ noted that the APA prevents courts from reviewing actions that are “committed to agency discretion by law.”253 Here,
the relevant statute (the National Security Act) provided that “[t]he
Director of Central Intelligence may, in his discretion, terminate the employment of any officer or employee . . . whenever he shall deem such
termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United
States.”254 This provision, the DOJ urged, committed termination decisions to the unreviewable discretion of the CIA.255
The DOJ recognized that, so construed, the statute raised constitutional concerns.256 But the government emphasized that “the national
security context in which the statute operates . . . distinguish[es] this case
from the far broader and much debated issue of legislative restriction of
federal court jurisdiction.”257 Given “the risks posed by judicial inquiry
into [CIA personnel decisions], . . . judicial review of national security
dismissals must be deemed precluded, even for . . . constitutional
claims.”258 Notably, however, the Justice Department did identify one limitation on Congress’s authority over federal jurisdiction, even in this national security context. The government stated: “[W]hether a particular
from him . . . an advantage he desires.”). Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that this
provision did not preclude jurisdiction over a constitutional challenge. See Johnson, 415
U.S. at 366–67, 373–74 (holding provision “is inapplicable to this action”); Hernandez, 415
U.S. at 393 (holding provision “does not bar judicial consideration of constitutional
challenges”).
249. Webster, 486 U.S. at 595.
250. Id. at 595–96.
251. Id. He alleged in part violations of his privacy and equal protection rights. Id. at
596.
252. See Brief for the Petitioner at 9–10, Webster, 486 U.S. 592 (No. 86-1294)
[hereinafter Brief for Petitioner, Webster] (summarizing argument that court lacks
jurisdiction for statutory and policy reasons).
253. Id. at 31 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
254. Webster, 486 U.S. at 594 (quoting National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80253, § 102(c), 61 Stat. 495, 498 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 403(c) (1982)))
(internal quotation marks omitted). The current version of the statute, which gives the CIA
Director the same basic authority, is codified at 50 U.S.C. § 403-4a(e)(1) (2006).
255. Brief for Petitioner, Webster, supra note 252, at 11–32.
256. See id. at 33 (defending constitutionality of denial of judicial remedy to former
CIA employee).
257. Id. at 33–34.
258. Id. at 44.
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preclusion of review is constitutional is itself a constitutional question,
review of which may not be precluded.”259
The Court in Webster found that the National Security Act (combined
with the APA) precluded review of the plaintiff’s statutory claims.260 But
the same language was not sufficient to prevent review of constitutional
issues. “[W]here Congress intends to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims its intent to do so must be clear. . . . Nothing in [these
statutes] persuades us that Congress meant to preclude consideration of
colorable constitutional claims . . . .”261
Webster demonstrates that the Justice Department has not always advocated a narrow construction of statutes that seem to preclude judicial
review. But the Court’s decision in Webster (and similar cases)262 did present a potential opportunity for the DOJ. To the extent that subsequent
administrations were inclined to argue for narrow interpretations of jurisdictional restrictions, such arguments would be substantially supported
by the Court’s clear-statement rule in Webster. Indeed, future Justice
Departments did rely on that case in urging the federal judiciary to adopt
narrow constructions of far more explicit jurisdiction-stripping laws.
2. The Clinton and George W. Bush Administrations. — The appellatereview provision in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA) was not its only controversial jurisdictional restriction.263 The
statute, along with the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA),264 purported to eliminate all federal
jurisdiction over certain deportation cases.
AEDPA (enacted on April 24, 1996) provided: “Any final order of
deportation against an alien who is deportable by reason of [a conviction
259. Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 15, Webster, 486 U.S. 592 (No. 86-1294)
[hereinafter Reply Brief for Petitioner, Webster].
260. 486 U.S. at 600–01 (concluding statute allowing termination of CIA employee
“whenever the Director ‘shall deem [it] necessary . . . ,’ not simply when the dismissal is
necessary . . . ,” appeared “to foreclose the application of any meaningful judicial standard
of review” (quoting National Security Act of 1947, § 102(c), 61 Stat. at 498)).
261. Id. at 603–05 (remanding constitutional claim to district court). The Court had
articulated a similar clear-statement rule in a few prior cases. See Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of
Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 680–81 & n.12 (1986) (expressing reluctance to assume
Congress intended no review of constitutional claims without clear and convincing
evidence); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 762 (1975) (same); Johnson v. Robison, 415
U.S. 361, 373–74 (1974) (same). But, notably, in only one of those cases had the DOJ
specifically argued that the Court lacked jurisdiction over a constitutional claim. See supra
note 248 (discussing Johnson); see also Weinberger, 422 U.S. at 786–87 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing majority opinion sharply for discussing jurisdictional issue, given
that issue “was not raised in this Court by the parties”); Brief for the Petitioners at 17,
Bowen, 476 U.S. 667 (No. 85-225) (arguing Court “need not decide” whether Congress
precluded review of constitutional claims because claims at issue were too “insubstantial to
support . . . jurisdiction in any event”).
262. See supra note 261 (discussing Bowen, Weinberger, and Johnson).
263. See supra Part III.A (discussing AEDPA).
264. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C.).
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for certain enumerated crimes] shall not be subject to review by any
court.”265 On September 30, 1996, Congress enacted IIRIRA and crafted
a new jurisdiction-stripping provision to replace the one in AEDPA: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction
to review any final order of removal against an alien who is removable by
reason of having committed [certain] criminal offense[s] . . . .”266
The statutes thus appeared to eliminate all federal jurisdiction over
the claims of this class of undocumented immigrants. The legislative history supported that interpretation. Senator Spencer Abraham, the sponsor of the restriction in IIRIRA, declared that the law was designed to
“end judicial review for orders of deportation entered against these criminal aliens.”267
These provisions provoked considerable scholarly interest.268
Congress had finally enacted a jurisdiction-stripping law that seemed to
raise one of the most fundamental concerns of the court-curbing literature: Congress’s power to strip all federal jurisdiction over a class of cases.
However, as Ernest Young put it, “a funny thing happened on the
way to the courthouse.”269 From the outset of the litigation over these
provisions, the DOJ repeatedly conceded that the federal courts retained
jurisdiction over federal constitutional claims.270 Indeed, the DOJ argued
that the provisions “should be interpreted as preserving review” of consti265. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
§ 440(a), 110 Stat. 1214, 1276–77 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(10) (2006)).
266. IIRIRA § 306(a), 110 Stat. at 3009-607 to 3009-608 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1252). Another provision of IIRIRA channeled any available challenges to the
courts of appeals. See id. § 306(b), 110 Stat. at 3009-610 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(9)) (“Judicial review of all questions of law and fact . . . arising from any
action . . . to remove an alien . . . shall be available only in judicial review of a final
order . . . .”). Congress amended these provisions in 2005 to expressly restore federal
jurisdiction over constitutional and other legal claims. See REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-13, § 106(a), 119 Stat. 302, 310 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1252)
(“Nothing in . . . this Act . . . shall be construed as precluding review of constitutional
claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for review filed with an appropriate court
of appeals . . . .”).
267. 142 Cong. Rec. 10,052 (1996) (statement of Sen. Spencer Abraham).
268. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 203, at 2482 (“[A]t least since 1869, Congress’s threats
to curtail federal jurisdiction have been for the most part just that—empty threats. . . . But
in 1996, Congress broke the taboo on such legislation . . . .”); Vicki C. Jackson,
Introduction: Congressional Control of Jurisdiction and the Future of the Federal
Courts—Opposition, Agreement, and Hierarchy, 86 Geo. L.J. 2445, 2447 (1998) (agreeing
1996 legislation “call[ed] for renewed attention to the problem” of jurisdiction stripping);
Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of
Judicial Review, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1549, 1554 (2000) (“When the AEDPA [and] the
IIRIRA . . . burst on the scene in 1996, it appeared that some of the much-mooted
questions concerning the limits of Congress’s power over federal jurisdiction might at long
last be answered.”).
269. Young, supra note 268, at 1554.
270. See David M. McConnell, Judicial Review Under the Immigration and
Nationality Act: Habeas Corpus and the Coming of REAL ID (1996–2005), 51 N.Y.L. Sch.
L. Rev. 75, 90 (2006–2007) (“Notwithstanding the broadly worded judicial review bars . . . ,
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tutional claims.271 “Notwithstanding [IIRIRA]’s categorical language,
neither the text nor the legislative history . . . adverts specifically to preclusion of review of constitutional claims . . . .”272 Accordingly, the DOJ
urged, the courts “retain authority to consider such claims.”273
The federal courts willingly accepted the government’s concession
that they retained jurisdiction over constitutional claims. Thus, the D.C.
Circuit declared that it “need not decide” whether the 1996 laws eliminated jurisdiction over constitutional issues, “because . . . the Government concedes” that judicial review “remains available [for deportees] . . .
to raise substantial constitutional questions.”274 Likewise, given the government’s “conce[ssion] that federal courts must have jurisdiction to
hear claims of substantial constitutional error,” the Tenth Circuit “assumed that federal courts retained some sort of jurisdiction to hear
[such] claims.”275
The DOJ’s position significantly altered the nature of the litigation
over AEDPA and IIRIRA. The main issue was not whether Congress could
foreclose all judicial review for this class of claimants. Instead, the litigation focused on the proper forum for review and the scope of review. The
government contended that judicial review should take place in the
courts of appeals and should be limited to constitutional claims and “jurisdictional facts” (i.e., ensuring that the deportee was in fact convicted of
a crime that triggered the jurisdictional bar).276 By contrast, the immigrants sought a more expansive review via habeas corpus actions in federal district court.277 But no one claimed, as Senator Abraham had asthe government argued from the outset . . . that criminal aliens could still challenge their
deportation and removal orders . . . on constitutional grounds.”).
271. Brief for Respondent at 9–10, Flores-Miramontes v. INS, 212 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir.
1999) (No. 98-70924), 1999 WL 33631399, at *9–*10 (citing Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592,
603 (1988)) (emphasis added).
272. Brief for the Respondent at 23, Calcano-Martinez v. INS, 533 U.S. 348 (2001)
(No. 00-1011), 2001 WL 327595, at *23 [hereinafter Brief for Respondent, CalcanoMartinez].
273. Id. Notably, this language comes from a brief ultimately filed by the second Bush
Administration. See infra note 281 and accompanying text (noting that Bush Justice
Department took same approach as Clinton Administration).
274. Ramallo v. Reno, 114 F.3d 1210, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see Singh v. Reno, 182
F.3d 504, 509 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting “[t]he government concedes that the 1996
Amendments did not extinguish judicial review altogether” and concluding “direct review
in the courts of appeals remains an option for aliens wishing to challenge their deportation
on constitutional grounds”).
275. Jurado-Gutierrez v. Greene, 190 F.3d 1135, 1144 n.4 (10th Cir. 1999).
276. See Brief for Respondent at 67–71, Calcano-Martinez v. INS, 232 F.3d 328 (2d
Cir. 2000) (Nos. 98-4033, 98-4214, 98-4246), 2000 WL 33977917, at *67–*71 (arguing no
Suspension Clause violation because of availability of review).
277. See Brief for the Respondent at 7, INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (No. 00767), 2001 WL 324615, at *7 (arguing district courts retained jurisdiction to review “pure
question[s] of law” in habeas proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2241).
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serted, that Congress “end[ed] judicial review for orders of deportation
entered against these criminal aliens.”278
Ultimately, the Supreme Court resolved the issues of forum and
scope of review. In INS v. St. Cyr and Calcano-Martinez v. INS, the Court
held (contrary to the government’s position) that district courts retained
jurisdiction to review all legal challenges to removal via habeas corpus.279
Notably, in the opinion for the Court in Calcano-Martinez, Justice Stevens
remarked that even the government had not contended that AEDPA and
IIRIRA foreclosed all judicial review. He found it “instructive that the
Government acknowledge[d] that background principles of statutory
construction and constitutional concerns must be considered in determining the scope of [the] jurisdiction-stripping provisions.”280
This executive branch practice continued during the George W.
Bush Administration (at least outside the context of the war on terror,
which is discussed below in Part IV). The Bush Justice Department not
only retained the government’s arguments in the AEDPA and IIRIRA litigation,281 but it also applied the same approach in other cases—conceding federal jurisdiction over constitutional claims.282
Demore v. Kim offers a nice illustration.283 Demore involved a lawful
permanent resident alien (Hyung Joon Kim) who was awaiting deportation.284 Kim had applied for bail and his application was denied by the
Immigration and Naturalization Service pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c),
which requires the detention, without bail, of any deportee who was convicted of an “aggravated felony.”285 Kim argued that this “mandatory de278. 142 Cong. Rec. 10,052 (1996) (statement of Sen. Spencer Abraham).
279. See Calcano-Martinez v. INS, 533 U.S. 348, 349–50 (2001) (“[P]etitioners
must . . . proceed with their petitions for habeas corpus if they wish to obtain relief.”); St.
Cyr, 533 U.S. at 314 (holding “habeas jurisdiction under § 2241 was not repealed by
AEDPA and IIRIRA”).
280. Calcano-Martinez, 533 U.S. at 350 n.2.
281. The Supreme Court briefs in St. Cyr and Calcano-Martinez were filed after the
change in administrations. But the Bush Justice Department maintained the same
litigation position. See supra note 273. Although it would have been extremely unusual for
the government to change positions midstream, it would not have been unprecedented.
See Caplan, supra note 171, at 82 (observing Reagan Justice Department “switch[ed] sides”
in busing case left over from Carter era); Pacelle, supra note 69, at 40 (noting such
reversals are rare).
282. See, e.g., Brief for the Respondents at 12–13, Whitman v. Dep’t of Transp., 547
U.S. 512 (2005) (No. 04-1131), 2005 WL 2738321, at *12 (arguing although Civil Service
Reform Act generally “provides the exclusive remedy” for federal employee grievances,
“[i]f a grievance raises a substantial constitutional claim that . . . [cannot be addressed
through that scheme], the CSRA should not be construed to preclude” review of claim);
see also Whitman, 547 U.S. at 515 (per curiam) (remanding case to court of appeals to
address various issues that may “obviate the need to decide [the] more difficult question of
preclusion”).
283. 538 U.S. 510 (2003).
284. Id. at 513–14.
285. Id. at 513–14 & n.1 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1) (2000)). The INS was then part
of the Department of Justice and thus acting under the authority of the Attorney General.
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tention” provision was unconstitutional as applied to lawful permanent
residents.286
An amicus brief filed by two private organizations and a group of
legislators asserted that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction over the
case.287 The amici relied on the following provision:
The Attorney General’s discretionary judgment regarding the
application of [§ 1226] shall not be subject to review. No court
may set aside any action or decision by the Attorney General under this
section regarding the detention or release of any alien or the
grant, revocation, or denial of bond or parole.288
The amici argued that “the only plausible reading of [this provision] is
that Congress intended to prohibit federal courts from ‘set[ting] aside’
the INS’s detention of Mr. Kim and other similarly situated criminal
aliens.”289
The DOJ’s briefs were silent on the potential jurisdictional defect.
Instead, the government simply urged the Supreme Court to uphold the
statute on the merits.290 But, at the oral argument in Demore, Justice Scalia
brought up the jurisdictional issue in questioning Solicitor General Ted
Olson:
General Olson, do—do we have authority to entertain this
challenge? As you know, an amicus has raised a jurisdictional
question . . . .
The problem is section 1226(e) . . . . Now, is that provision,
number one, inapplicable or, number two, unconstitutional?
And if neither of those, why doesn’t it mean that we have no
authority to entertain this case?291
The question led to the following exchange:
See INS—Immigration and Naturalization Service, Immigration Direct, http://
www.immigrationdirect.com/immigration-articles/index.html (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (last visited Nov. 11, 2011) (noting INS became part of DOJ in 1940).
286. Demore, 538 U.S. at 514–15.
287. See Brief of Washington Legal Foundation; Allied Educational Foundation; U.S.
Reps. Bob Barr, Joe Barton, John Doolittle, Walter Jones, and Lamar Smith; and U.S.
Senator Jesse Helms as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 5, Demore, 538 U.S. 510
(No. 01-1491), 2002 WL 2008201, at *5 [hereinafter Demore Amicus Brief] (“[T]he lower
courts did not possess jurisdiction to overturn the INS’s decision to detain Mr. Kim.”).
288. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) (emphasis added); Demore Amicus Brief, supra note 287, at 5.
289. Demore Amicus Brief, supra note 287, at 8 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e)).
290. See Brief for the Petitioner at 9, Demore, 538 U.S. 510 (No. 01-1491), 2002 WL
31016560, at *9 (arguing Congress reasonably concluded “mandatory detention . . . is
necessary to implement its immigration policies”). The DOJ’s only apparent reference to
the jurisdictional issue was the following statement in its reply brief: “The government does
not dispute the availability of judicial review for compliance with the Due Process Clause in
this case.” Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 6, Demore, 538 U.S. 510 (No. 01-1491), 2002 WL
31969024, at *6.
291. Transcript of Oral Argument at 3–4, Demore, 538 U.S. 510 (No. 01-1491)
[hereinafter Transcript of Oral Argument, Demore], available at http://www.supremecourt.
gov/oral_arguments/arguments_transcripts/01-1491.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
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MR. OLSON: Justice Scalia, it’s the Government’s position . . . that that provision does not apply to a habeas corpus
challenge to the constitutionality of the statute itself . . . .
....
QUESTION: And—and you’re relying on what language
to—
MR. OLSON: Well, we’re relying on the language that . . .
refers to . . . administrative actions[ ] by the Attorney General or
immigration . . . officials, and this Court’s construction of statutes against precluding constitutional challenges to other
statutes.
QUESTION: Oh, but all of those other statutes had some
wiggle room I think, even St. Cyr, and there just is no wiggle
room here. . . . It simply says, no court may set aside any action
by the Attorney General under this section.
....
MR. OLSON: . . .[W]hile it would be in the Government’s
interest to preclude this challenge at all, we think a fair reading
of the Court’s decisions . . . would be to construe that statute as
not to preclude this action in this case. Of course, . . . your construction would lead to a—a victory on behalf of the Government in this case, but we’ve carefully examined it, and . . . we’re
not advocating that position here today.292
Justice O’Connor later raised the jurisdictional issue with Kim’s
counsel, noting that the Court could address the matter, “despite the
Government’s failure to raise it.”293 Justice O’Connor asked: “[W]hy
doesn’t section 1226 tell the courts to keep hands off?”294 Kim’s counsel
responded: “We agree with the Solicitor General’s explanation.”295
Justice O’Connor replied (provoking laughter from the audience): “I
have to tell you I don’t understand it. I thought maybe you’d enlighten
me there.”296
Ultimately, by a 6-3 majority, the Supreme Court held that it had
jurisdiction over the case.297 The Court emphasized that “where Congress
intends to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims its intent to do
so must be clear.”298 Under that standard, § 1226(e) did “not bar [Kim’s]
constitutional challenge.”299 The Court then, by a different 5-4 majority,
went on to uphold the statute on the merits.300 (Justice O’Connor, in a
292. Id. at 4–6.
293. Id. at 27–28.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id. Kim’s counsel stated that, because “[the] statute contains no express
language that repeals habeas jurisdiction,” the federal courts retained such jurisdiction. Id.
297. Demore, 538 U.S. at 516–17.
298. Id. at 517 (quoting Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
299. Id.
300. See id. at 513 (holding “Congress, justifiably concerned that deportable criminal
aliens . . . fail to appear for their removal hearings in large numbers, may require”
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separate opinion joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, dissented from
the jurisdictional holding, but concurred in the judgment on the
merits.301)
As these examples illustrate, on a number of occasions, the DOJ has
encouraged the federal courts to follow the approach suggested years ago
by Professor Hart. In his dialogue, Professor Hart argued that the judiciary “should use every possible resource of [statutory] construction to
avoid the conclusion” that Congress stripped federal jurisdiction over
constitutional claims.302 The DOJ has not, of course, adopted this approach in every case. But, in recent years, the Solicitor General has consistently done so, even in the face of “categorical [statutory] language,”303
strong evidence in the legislative history, and (as Demore illustrates) even
when some members of the Supreme Court expressly invite a
“jurisdiction-stripping” claim.
The federal judiciary has generally proven quite receptive to these
arguments. Thus, with some executive encouragement, the courts appear
to have adopted the super strong, clear-statement rule advocated by Professor Hart: “If Congress wants to frustrate the judicial check, our constitutional tradition requires that it be made to say so unmistakably . . . .”304
IV. THE SCOPE

AND

LIMITS

OF

ARTICLE II SAFEGUARDS

The executive branch has repeatedly sought to protect the Supreme
Court’s appellate jurisdiction and federal jurisdiction over constitutional
claims. Attorneys General of both parties have condemned jurisdictionstripping bills in decisive terms, stating that “[m]atters of constitutional
interpretation and adjudication are . . . pre-eminently within the province
of the Federal judiciary,”305 and that “[f]ull and unimpaired appellate
jurisdiction in the Supreme Court is fundamental under our system of
government.”306 Furthermore, even when jurisdiction-stripping statutes
have been enacted, the executive branch has urged the federal courts to
mandatory detention). Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented from the
Court’s holding on the merits. Id. at 540 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); id. at 576 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
301. Id. at 533 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(asserting “a majority having determined there is jurisdiction, I agree with the Court’s
resolution . . . on the merits,” but also asserting that the statute “unequivocally deprives
federal courts of jurisdiction to set aside ‘any action or decision’ by the Attorney General in
detaining criminal aliens under § 1226(c)” and noting “[t]hat is precisely the nature of the
action before us”).
302. Hart, supra note 24, at 1399.
303. Brief for Respondent, Calcano-Martinez, supra note 272, at 23.
304. Hart, supra note 24, at 1399.
305. 125 Cong. Rec. 7637 (1979) (letter from Griffin B. Bell, Att’y Gen., to Sen.
Abraham Ribicoff, Chairman, S. Comm. on Gov’t Operations).
306. Limitation of Appellate Jurisdiction Hearings 1958, supra note 139, at 573 (letter
from William P. Rogers, Att’y Gen., to Sen. James O. Eastland, Chairman, S. Comm. on
Judiciary).
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construe such laws narrowly in order to preserve the Court’s appellate
review power and federal jurisdiction over constitutional claims.
These Article II safeguards are not, however, absolute. The executive
branch’s repeated efforts to protect the judiciary, along with the counterexamples, raise questions about the scope and limitations of the Article II
safeguards of federal jurisdiction.
A. The Possible Divergence of Presidential and DOJ Incentives
The discussion of these Article II safeguards has, for the most part,
treated the executive branch as a single entity. But, of course, there may
be important ways in which the institutional incentives of a particular
President and his Justice Department differ. Given that the DOJ’s primary
function is to litigate cases in federal court, it may be even more inclined
than the President to protect the scope of federal jurisdiction. These
agency-specific incentives may help explain why the executive branch has
been so consistent in defending the federal courts.
1. The Existence of “Agency Slack.” — A number of scholars have examined the relationship between the Attorney General and the Solicitor
General and the President, analyzing how much influence the President
has—or should have—over his chief law enforcement officers.307 The approach taken by scholars generally turns on whether they view the executive branch as a hierarchical “unitary executive.”308 This Article does not
attempt to enter that debate. The Article assumes, for purposes of analy307. For discussions of the Attorney General, compare Susan Low Bloch, The Early
Role of the Attorney General in Our Constitutional Scheme: In the Beginning There Was
Pragmatism, 1989 Duke L.J. 561, 633–38 (arguing history does not clearly show President
must have direct control over Attorney General’s actions), William P. Marshall, Break Up
the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General, and Lessons from the Divided
Executive, 115 Yale L.J. 2446, 2478–79 (2006) (suggesting “[a]n independent attorney
general, in the form of the state divided executive”), and Norman W. Spaulding,
Professional Independence in the Office of the Attorney General, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 1931,
1977–78 (2008) (advocating “structural changes that would enhance [the Attorney
General’s] independence”), with Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary
Executive: Presidential Power from Washington to Bush 8–9 (2008) (arguing for
presidential control and claiming “all forty-three presidents have always resisted serious
incursions on the principle of the unitary executive”), and Saikrishna Prakash, The Chief
Prosecutor, 73 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 521, 546 (2005) (asserting historical evidence suggests
Attorney General is “executive officer[ ] under presidential control”). For discussions of
the Solicitor General, compare Caplan, supra note 171, at 7, 114 (arguing for
independence from President, using Solicitor General Rex Lee as example), and
Testimony of Professor Burt Neuborne New York University Law School Before the
Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Judiciary Committee Mar. 19, 1987, 21 Loy. L.A.
L. Rev. 1099, 1100 (1988) (asserting Solicitor General “should . . . minimize[ ] . . . the
influence of politics”), with Salokar, supra note 170, at 34 (contending Solicitor General is
“no more independent than . . . any other political appointee”), and John O. McGinnis,
Principle Versus Politics: The Solicitor General’s Office in Constitutional and Bureaucratic
Theory, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 799, 804–05 (1992) (noting Solicitor General is obligated to
“advance the President’s interpretation of the Constitution and the laws made under it”).
308. See sources cited supra note 307.
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sis, that the President has the power to order his Attorney General to
testify in favor of jurisdiction-stripping bills in Congress. Likewise, the
Article assumes that the President could direct his Solicitor General to
advocate a broader construction of jurisdiction-stripping laws.309 As
Matthew Stephenson has observed, even scholars who argue for strong
political control of the bureaucracy (either by Congress or the President)
acknowledge that agencies are, as a practical matter, somewhat insulated
from their political superiors.310 Political actors lack the resources, expertise, and sometimes the political will to direct all the actions of their administrative subordinates.311 Furthermore, as scholars have emphasized
in the context of the Solicitor General, it may be in the best interest of
the President (and the executive branch more broadly) to give the chief
Supreme Court advocate some room to maneuver, absent political oversight. If the Supreme Court views the Solicitor General as an independent and impartial advocate, the government may be far more likely to
win its cases before the Court.312
Thus, even under the assumption that the President could direct the
actions of the Attorney General and the Solicitor General, there is good
reason to believe that he will not always do so. These executive officials
will thus often have some leeway in expressing their views on matters pertaining to federal jurisdiction. These officials can use this “agency slack”
to offer more emphatic defenses of the judiciary than the President himself might be inclined to do.
2. Agency Slack in the Legislative Process. — Although the willingness of
the Roosevelt and Reagan Administrations to defend the scope of federal
jurisdiction may at first glance seem the most surprising, those examples
on reflection may in fact make the most sense. Both President Roosevelt
and President Reagan were “reconstructive” leaders who sought to
change the constitutional and political landscape.313 These leaders recognized that, in order to have a long-term impact on the development of
federal law, they needed to remake the federal judiciary, and particularly
309. This Article thus does not take a position on debates over the “unitary executive.”
For discussions of these debates, see, for example, Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes,
The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1153,
1155 (1992) (considering unitary executive debate in relation to Article III jurisdictionstripping debate); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the
Administration, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1994) (arguing unitary executive to be a recent
construction and not Framers’ original intent).
310. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 107
Mich. L. Rev. 53, 57–58 (2008) (“[I]t is too costly to eliminate bureaucratic insulation
completely.”).
311. See id. (“The fact that elected officials have limited time and expertise, for
example, may make some de facto bureaucratic autonomy inevitable.”).
312. See, e.g., Eric Schnapper, Becket at the Bar—The Conflicting Obligations of the
Solicitor General, 21 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1187, 1269 (1988) (arguing Solicitor General’s lack
of independence would impair effectiveness as appellate litigator).
313. See supra Part II.A, D (discussing Roosevelt and Reagan Administrations’
approaches, respectively).
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the Supreme Court. Accordingly, they sought to appoint judges who were
likely to implement their constitutional vision in future federal court decisions. These Presidents thus also had an incentive to preserve federal
jurisdiction over constitutional claims, so that this more “friendly” judiciary could “fix” what the leaders saw as the constitutional errors of the
past. Both leaders had particularly good reason to protect the Supreme
Court’s appellate jurisdiction, because its “decisions would establish the
legal and ideological framework within which [the lower courts] . . .
[would] operat[e].”314 In sum, Presidents who seek to “reconstruct” the
constitutional order have a strong incentive to preserve the scope of federal jurisdiction.
Accordingly, there is good reason to believe that Roosevelt’s
Attorney General Homer Cummings and Reagan’s Attorneys General
William French Smith and Ed Meese were acting in accordance with their
leaders’ wishes when they opposed efforts to strip jurisdiction. Moreover,
that assumption is consistent with the way in which these Attorneys
General usually interacted with their Presidents. Social scientists have described Cummings, Smith, and Meese as “Advocate” Attorneys General
who were personally close to the President and who saw it as their job to
fulfill the political and legal aspirations of that elected leader.315 These
Attorneys General were thus unlikely to take positions on jurisdictional
issues that were contrary to the President’s views.316
Presidents Eisenhower and Carter, by contrast, did not seek to “reconstruct” the constitutional order. These Presidents, of course (like all
leaders), had an opportunity to shape the judiciary through their appointments. But there is little evidence that these leaders had a particular
vision that they sought to advance through the federal courts.317 In fact,
both Presidents largely deferred legal matters to their Attorneys
General.318 Both Eisenhower’s Attorney General William Rogers and
314. Gillman, Agendas, supra note 85, at 518.
315. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 171, at 35, 77, 95, 170 (arguing such “Advocate”
Attorneys General “tend to be more responsive to the desires of the electorate or the
president than to the niceties of the rule of law”). Indeed, Meese has been called Reagan’s
ideological “alter ego.” Id. at 97.
316. Indeed, President Roosevelt was personally involved in the discussions leading
up to the Court-packing plan. See Shesol, supra note 92, at 203–04, 259–62 (detailing
Roosevelt’s involvement). So if Roosevelt had viewed jurisdiction stripping as a better
alternative, he likely would have said so.
317. President Carter’s nominations did, however, reflect an apparent attempt to
diversify the judiciary by appointing more women and minorities. See Joan Biskupic,
Obama’s Push for Court Diversity Hits Snag, USA Today (June 15, 2010), http://
www.usatoday.com/news/washington/judicial/2010-06-15-diversity-lower-courts_N.htm
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing Carter’s presidency as “breakthrough
for non-traditional appointees”).
318. See Baker, supra note 171, at 155–56 (noting President Carter encouraged
Attorney General Griffin Bell to maintain independence of his office); Whittington,
Foundations, supra note 50, at 147, 219 (describing how Eisenhower entrusted legal
matters, including Supreme Court appointments, to his Attorneys General). This does not
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Carter’s Attorney General Griffin Bell used this “agency slack” to defend
the scope of federal jurisdiction.319 Thus, although Presidents
Eisenhower and Carter refused to either endorse or criticize federal court
decisions, their Attorneys General argued emphatically that “[m]atters of
constitutional interpretation and adjudication are . . . pre-eminently
within the province of the Federal judiciary,”320 and that “[f]ull and
unimpaired appellate jurisdiction in the Supreme Court is fundamental
under our system of government.”321
The consistency of the Attorney General’s approach to jurisdictionstripping proposals may also reflect the importance of precedent within
the Department of Justice. As Trevor Morrison has recently recounted,
the Attorney General has traditionally treated the legal opinions of his
predecessors as “precedents” that must be accorded considerable weight
in the future.322 That has been equally true of the DOJ’s approach to
jurisdictional restrictions. Indeed, Attorney General Smith expressly invoked precedent in support of his view that any limitation on the
Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction over constitutional claims would
be both unwise and unconstitutional.323
Moreover, Attorney General Smith solidified this precedent by publishing his own strong defense of the federal judiciary as an official Office
of Legal Counsel opinion. As Professor Morrison explains, the executive
mean that these Presidents gave their Attorneys General free rein. President Carter, for
example, intervened in some cases litigated by the DOJ during his presidency and
expressly overruled one of Bell’s decisions. See Baker, supra note 171, at 156–60
(describing conflicts between Carter and Bell). But these Attorneys General were more
independent of presidential control than their counterparts in the Reagan and Roosevelt
administrations.
319. See supra Part II.B–C (discussing Eisenhower and Carter administrations’
approaches, respectively). The Eisenhower Justice Department may have taken advantage
of this “agency slack” to protect the Supreme Court’s civil rights jurisprudence. Although
the DOJ did not support the Court’s “subversive activity” decisions, it did endorse the
Court’s racial equality rulings (more so than did the President himself). See Baker, supra
note 171, at 68 (explaining Eisenhower’s first Attorney General Herbert Brownell strongly
supported civil rights); Pacelle, supra note 69, at 74–75 (discussing approaches Eisenhower
Attorneys General took towards civil rights). Thus, the Eisenhower Justice Department had
an incentive—separate and apart from the President’s incentives—to defend the Supreme
Court’s appellate jurisdiction to ensure that the Court could continue to play a role in civil
rights cases.
320. 125 Cong. Rec. 7637 (1979) (letter from Att’y Gen. Griffin Bell).
321. Limitation of Appellate Jurisdiction Hearings 1958, supra note 139, at 573 (letter
from Att’y Gen. William Rogers).
322. Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 Colum. L.
Rev. 1448, 1470–92 (2010) [hereinafter Morrison, Stare Decisis].
323. See 128 Cong. Rec. 9094 n.1 (1982) (letter from William French Smith, Att’y
Gen., to Sen. Strom Thurmond, Chairman, S. Judiciary Comm.) (observing “[t]he
Department of Justice, in previous Administrations, has consistently opposed proposals to
restrict Supreme Court jurisdiction,” and citing congressional testimony by DOJ officials as
well as internal DOJ memos dating from 1950s to 1980s).
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branch does not often depart from such precedents.324 The DOJ seems
particularly unlikely to depart from an approach to jurisdiction stripping
that has been repeatedly accepted by both Democratic and Republican
administrations. Thus, the Justice Department’s institutional interest in
protecting its power and influence over the development of federal law,
combined with its institutional respect for stare decisis, gives the Attorney
General strong reasons to continue to oppose jurisdiction-stripping proposals in Congress.325
3. Agency Slack in the Litigation Process. — The Solicitor General also
has independent institutional reasons to advocate a narrow construction
of jurisdiction-stripping laws. The Solicitor General serves as the executive branch’s conduit to the Supreme Court. Thus, “[o]nce cases reach
the Supreme Court, the Solicitor General plays an important role in the
development of American law” and can have a substantial “impact upon
the establishment of constitutional and other [legal] principles.”326
This advocacy position seems likely to have two important effects on
the Solicitor General’s approach to jurisdiction-stripping legislation.
First, the Solicitor General should be especially wary of any effort to restrict the Supreme Court’s appellate review power, such as the provision
at issue in Felker v. Turpin;327 any such restriction undermines the
Solicitor General’s own influence over the development of federal law.
Second, the Solicitor General is likely to take cues from Supreme Court
precedent in determining how to construe any jurisdictional provision.
As the quintessential “repeat player” before the Court,328 the Solicitor
General has a strong interest in maintaining a good reputation with the
Justices. Accordingly, the Solicitor General may be especially inclined to
advocate a narrow construction of jurisdiction-stripping legislation if such
a construction will be a winning argument before the Court (or if a contrary argument would harm the Solicitor General’s reputation with the
Court).
This “repeat player” dynamic helps explain why the Justice
Department has been increasingly resistant to jurisdiction-stripping laws.
324. Morrison, Stare Decisis, supra note 322, at 1457–58 (asserting, based on
empirical analysis of Office of Legal Counsel precedents from Carter through Obama
Administrations, the “OLC does not often overrule itself”).
325. The executive branch does not appear to have issued any public statements
about recent efforts in 2004 and 2006 to strip federal jurisdiction over constitutional
challenges to the Defense of Marriage Act and to the use of “under God” in the Pledge of
Allegiance. See Grove, supra note 40, at 911–16 (describing legislative history of these
unsuccessful proposals). The OLC has informed me that there are no public documents
pertaining to this legislation. Nevertheless, given the executive branch’s longstanding
opposition to such jurisdiction-stripping measures, it seems unlikely that the DOJ endorsed
these proposals.
326. Days, supra note 69, at 680.
327. See supra notes 210–211 and accompanying text (describing provision at issue in
Felker).
328. See, e.g., Salokar, supra note 170, at 3 (describing Solicitor General as “the ideal
‘Repeat Player’”).
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After the Supreme Court handed down Webster v. Doe and similar decisions, stating that it would construe statutes narrowly in order to preserve
federal court review of constitutional claims, the Solicitor General had a
strong incentive to adopt such a narrow construction of future federal
laws.329
This observation, of course, raises the question whether the Solicitor
General’s arguments have driven the Supreme Court’s narrow construction of jurisdiction-stripping laws, or vice versa. But these two possibilities
may not be mutually exclusive. As the Vietnam War era examples illustrate, the Solicitor General was resistant to jurisdictional restrictions even
before the Supreme Court adopted its clear-statement rule regarding
constitutional claims.330 Moreover, even when the Solicitor General did
argue that a statute precluded jurisdiction over constitutional claims, he
made that argument in very narrow terms. For example, in Webster,
Solicitor General Fried emphasized that “the national security context” of
that case “distinguish[ed] [it] from the far broader and much debated
issue of legislative restriction of federal court jurisdiction,”331 and further
declared that “whether a particular preclusion of review is constitutional
is itself a constitutional question, review of which may not be precluded.”332 It thus does not appear that the Solicitor General’s approach
was entirely caused by Supreme Court precedent.
But, once the Supreme Court issued its clear-statement rule, that
precedent undoubtedly encouraged the Solicitor General to take a more
definitive stance on jurisdictional restrictions. As Solicitor General Olson
acknowledged in Demore v. Kim, it is often in a government client’s best
interest for the DOJ to argue that the court has no jurisdiction over the
case.333 The Solicitor General can more easily justify a jurisdictional argument that is adverse to his client’s interests if that argument seems virtually “compelled” by Supreme Court precedent.
Accordingly, it appears that the Supreme Court’s decisions, and the
Solicitor General’s corresponding arguments, have been mutually beneficial and complementary. The Court’s jurisprudence makes it easier for
the Solicitor General to advocate a narrow construction of jurisdictionstripping laws; and the DOJ’s arguments, in turn, provide the federal
courts with reassurance that such a narrow construction will have the support of a coequal branch of the federal government.

329. See supra notes 248–262 (discussing Webster).
330. See supra notes 231–244 and accompanying text (discussing Solicitor General’s
resistance to jurisdiction stripping with regard to draft).
331. Brief for Petitioner, Webster, supra note 252, at 33–34.
332. Reply Brief for Petitioner, Webster, supra note 259, at 15. The same was true of
the Justice Department’s arguments in Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974). See supra
note 248.
333. See supra notes 283–301 and accompanying text (discussing Demore v. Kim).
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B. The Limits of Article II Safeguards: Executive Acquiescence in Jurisdiction
Stripping
The executive branch has repeatedly defended the federal judiciary,
seeking to protect the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction and federal
jurisdiction over constitutional claims. But these Article II safeguards
have not been absolute. The counterexamples raise the question of when,
and under what circumstances, the executive branch is less likely to oppose jurisdiction stripping. Although this Article does not attempt to
solve that difficult analytical puzzle, it suggests two factors that seem to
influence the executive branch’s approach.334
334. Although there is insufficient evidence for a definitive conclusion, the executive
branch’s support for the judiciary may also be a modern development. As Parts II and III
suggest, much of the evidence of executive support for the judiciary dates from the
beginning of the twentieth century to the present day. That may reflect in large part the
fact that most challenges to the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction and to federal
jurisdiction over constitutional claims have occurred during that modern era. But there
were a few legislative challenges to the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction in the
nineteenth century, and the executive branch’s record is mixed. The executive branch
took no position on an 1831 effort to strip the Court’s appellate jurisdiction over state
court appeals. See supra note 80. But the executive strongly opposed the most dramatic
challenge to the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction. In 1868, Congress restricted the
Supreme Court’s jurisdiction over a class of habeas claims in order to prevent the Court
from reviewing the constitutionality of the reconstruction laws. See supra note 96.
President Andrew Johnson attempted (unsuccessfully) to block the measure by vetoing it,
asserting that any attempt to prevent Supreme Court review of a constitutional claim was
“not in harmony with the spirit and intention of the Constitution.” Cong. Globe, 40th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2094 (1868). The measure was enacted only over President Johnson’s veto.
See supra notes 80, 96 (discussing these events).
By contrast, the executive branch supported another provision that interfered with
(albeit without stripping) the Court’s appellate review power. In the late 1860s, John Klein,
the administrator of the estate of a Mississippi cotton farmer whose property was taken by
the federal government (and who later received a presidential pardon), sought to recover
the proceeds of the deceased’s property. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 136
(1871). The Court of Claims ruled in favor of Klein, and the government appealed to the
Supreme Court. Id. at 143. In 1870, while the case was on appeal, Congress enacted (with
the support of President Ulysses S. Grant) a law directing the Court to dismiss such claims
“for want of jurisdiction.” Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 25, 16 Stat. 230, 235 (1870) (“[I]n all
cases where judgment shall have been heretofore rendered in the court of claims in favor
of any claimant [based on a pardon] . . . , the Supreme Court shall, on appeal, have no
further jurisdiction of the cause, and shall dismiss the same for want of jurisdiction.”). The
Attorney General urged the Supreme Court to apply the statute and to dismiss Klein’s suit.
See Brief for Appellants at 3, Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (No. 156). The Court instead
invalidated the statute. See Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 147–48. Although scholars have
debated the precise ground of the Court’s decision, see Howard M. Wasserman,
Constitutional Pathology, the War on Terror, and United States v. Klein, 5 J. Nat’l Security L.
& Pol’y 211, 211 (2011) (collecting sources describing Klein as “opaque” and “deeply
puzzling”), it appears that the Court struck down the statute both as an unconstitutional
infringement on the President’s pardon power and as an infringement on the judicial
power to choose the rule of decision for a particular case. See Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at
147–48.
Notably, as the Supreme Court observed, the statute at issue in Klein was not a
jurisdiction-stripping law akin to those discussed in this Article. See id. at 146. The statute
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In prior work, I have argued that jurisdiction-stripping measures are
more likely to be enacted when there is a major historical event that creates overwhelming political support for limitations on federal jurisdiction.335 This factor seems to partly explain the President’s support for
measures that appeared (on their face) to eliminate the Supreme Court’s
appellate jurisdiction or federal jurisdiction over constitutional claims.
For example, although members of Congress had sought for years to enact habeas reform, they did not assemble sufficient political support for
AEDPA and IIRIRA—nor did they have the strong backing of President
Clinton—until after the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995.336
But another factor (aside from such historical “triggering events”)
also seems to influence the President’s recent willingness to sign

granted the Court jurisdiction to hear claims raised by former confederates. But when (as
in Klein) the Court of Claims had ruled in favor of the former confederate, the statute
directed the Supreme Court to overrule that decision and rule for the government—by
dismissing the claim for “want of jurisdiction.” See id. (“The court has jurisdiction of the
cause to a given point; but when it ascertains that a certain state of things exists, its
jurisdiction is to cease and it is required to dismiss the cause for want of jurisdiction.”).
Nevertheless, the executive branch’s acquiescence in this provision is in some tension with
the analysis here. Given the paucity (and conflicting nature) of the evidence from the
nineteenth century, it is not clear whether the executive branch was a protection for the
judiciary during this early era.
335. Grove, supra note 40, at 916–20. This factor helps explain the enactment of
several jurisdiction-stripping laws, including those that do not interfere with the executive
branch’s interest in preserving Supreme Court review and federal jurisdiction over
constitutional claims. For example, jurisdictional restrictions were enacted in the wake of
the stock market crash of 1929 and the ensuing Great Depression, see Norris-LaGuardia
Act, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101–115 (2006)) (restricting lower
federal courts’ authority to issue injunctions in labor disputes); H.R. Rep. No. 72-669, at
11–16 (1932) (making clear that Norris-LaGuardia Act applied only to “the inferior
Federal courts”); during World War II, see Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, 56
Stat. 23 (allowing only Supreme Court, and not any lower federal or state court, to review
certain administrative orders), amended by Act of July 25, 1946, ch. 671, 60 Stat. 664, 664;
Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 429–30, 443 (1944) (upholding Emergency Price
Control Act); and in the wake of the September 11 attacks and the ensuing war on terror,
see Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e), 119 Stat. 2680, 2742
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006)) (restricting federal habeas
jurisdiction over claims of aliens detained at Guantanamo Bay); Military Commissions Act
of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7, 120 Stat. 2600, 2635–36 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e))
(restricting federal habeas jurisdiction over claims of noncitizens designated as “enemy
combatants”); see also infra notes 342–345 and accompanying text (discussing war-onterror legislation).
336. See Remarks on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, 1 Pub. Papers 630, 630–31 (Apr. 24, 1996) (stating Clinton supported “additional”
antiterrorism legislation after Oklahoma City bombing); Carrie M. Bowden, Note, The
Need for Comity: A Proposal for Federal Court Review of Suppression Issues in the Dual
Sovereignty Context After the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 60
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 185, 215 (2003) (“Although Congress considered habeas corpus
reform for many years prior to the enactment of AEDPA, Congress wanted to take a hard
line on crime after the Oklahoma City terrorism bombing.”).
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jurisdiction-stripping legislation.337 As discussed in Part II, the executive
branch has repeatedly opposed jurisdiction-stripping proposals that were
considered as stand-alone measures. More recent jurisdiction-stripping
provisions, by contrast, have been part of omnibus legislation.
As social scientists have observed, Presidents are less likely to veto any
measure—even one that they strongly oppose on either constitutional or
policy grounds—when it is part of an omnibus bill, the bulk of which the
President strongly supports.338 Presidents instead often respond to such
omnibus legislation by issuing signing statements, declaring that they will
interpret and enforce the problematic provision in a manner that accords
with the Constitution.339 This same dynamic may help explain the
President’s willingness to sign recent jurisdiction-stripping legislation.
AEDPA and IIRIRA were complex statutes that contained many provisions other than the jurisdiction-stripping provisions discussed here.340
Likewise, the provision in Demore v. Kim was part of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, an enormous piece of legislation that governs numerous
aspects of immigration and naturalization.341 Just as Presidents have been
inclined in recent years to sign large omnibus legislation, and yet “oppose” certain provisions via signing statements, Presidents may be willing
to sign such legislation, and yet permit the Department of Justice to “oppose” the jurisdiction-stripping provisions via litigation.
Thus, the executive branch seems most likely to consent to jurisdictional restrictions (1) following a major historical event, and (2) when
the jurisdictional restriction is integrated into an expansive statute, the
bulk of which the President supports. These factors may help explain the
enactment of recent jurisdiction-stripping laws in response to the “war on
terror.”342 Notably, these statutes largely preserved the Supreme Court’s
337. Indeed, the concept of “triggering events” seems an insufficient explanation for
the President’s approach. After all, in the wake of one major historical event (the Civil
War), President Andrew Johnson vetoed the 1868 legislation that sought to restrict the
Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction over habeas cases. See supra note 81 (noting how
reconstruction laws were enacted over President Andrew Johnson’s veto).
338. See, e.g., Glen S. Krutz, Tactical Maneuvering on Omnibus Bills in Congress, 45
Am. J. Pol. Sci. 210, 212 (2001) (asserting “Congressional leaders may include measures
that the president opposes in omnibus bills in order to avert a veto” and that “the power of
the presidential veto is [thereby] diluted”).
339. See Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. Posner, Presidential Signing Statements and
Executive Power, 23 Const. Comment. 307, 341 (2006) (arguing “as a political matter
[Presidents] will not be able to veto [omnibus legislation] simply because of constitutional
concerns about a particular provision,” and that Presidents can better oppose such
measures by issuing signing statements); Paul T. Stepnowsky, Deference to Presidential
Signing Statements in Administrative Law, 78 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1086, 1090 (2010)
(“[T]he size and complexity of omnibus legislation has incentivized the use of signing
statements when the Executive seeks to challenge a narrow portion of a statute without
using his veto authority.”).
340. See supra Part III (discussing jurisdictional restrictions in AEDPA and IIRIRA).
341. See supra notes 283–301 and accompanying text (discussing Demore v. Kim).
342. The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA) and the Military Commissions Act of
2006 (MCA) were designed to eliminate federal habeas jurisdiction over the claims of
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appellate jurisdiction and federal jurisdiction over constitutional
claims343 and thus did not interfere with the executive branch’s principal
concerns about federal jurisdiction. But one provision of the Military
Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA) does purport to eliminate federal jurisdiction over a detainee’s challenge to his “conditions of confinement”
during his detention.344 It does not appear that the second Bush
Administration made any public statements about this provision during
the legislative process.345 But the executive branch’s acceptance of this
jurisdiction-stripping measure arguably accords with the analysis here.
The MCA was enacted in the wake of a major historical event: the attacks
of September 11, 2001 and the ensuing war on terror. Moreover, the
MCA was an expansive statute, the bulk of which the President supported.
However, with respect to the MCA, there are reasons to doubt that
the executive branch simply acquiesced in a jurisdictional restriction
championed by members of Congress. Although the executive does not
alleged enemy combatants in the war on terror. See DTA, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e),
119 Stat. 2680, 2742 (2005) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006)) (stating “no court,
justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider . . . a writ of habeas corpus filed
by or on behalf of an alien detained . . . at Guantanamo Bay”); MCA, Pub. L. No. 109-366,
§ 7, 120 Stat. 2600, 2635–36 (2006) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(1)) (stating “[n]o
court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider . . . a writ of habeas
corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien . . . who has been determined . . . to have been
properly detained as an enemy combatant”). Those claims were instead routed to a military
tribunal (either a combatant status review tribunal or a military commission) followed by
judicial review in the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court. See DTA, § 1005(e), 119 Stat. at
2742 (stating D.C. Circuit “shall have exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of any
final decision of a Combatant Status Review Tribunal that an alien is properly detained as
an enemy combatant”); MCA, § 950(g), 120 Stat. at 2622 (stating D.C. Circuit “shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of a final judgment rendered by a military
commission”). Although the DTA gives the D.C. Circuit “exclusive” jurisdiction to review
decisions of combatant status review tribunals, such “exclusivity” provisions are generally
construed so as to preserve Supreme Court review. See, e.g., Administrative Orders Review
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2342 (2006) (providing that “[t]he court of appeals . . . has exclusive
jurisdiction” to review “final orders” from certain federal agencies); Fed. Mar. Comm’n v.
S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 750–51 (2002) (reviewing court of appeals decision in
case brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2342).
343. See supra note 342 (explaining provisions preserved Supreme Court review).
The provisions of the DTA and the MCA creating the alternative review processes also
expressly preserved review of any applicable constitutional claims. See DTA
§ 1005(e)(2)(C), 119 Stat. at 2742 (permitting D.C. Circuit to review “to the extent the
Constitution and laws of the United States are applicable, whether the use of [certain]
standards and procedures [by combatant status review tribunals] is consistent with the
Constitution and laws of the United States”); MCA § 950g, 120 Stat. at 2622 (permitting
D.C. Circuit to consider whether, “to the extent applicable,” “the final decision [of the
military commission] was consistent with . . . the Constitution and the laws of the United
States”).
344. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(2) (foreclosing any challenge to a detainee’s
“conditions of confinement” in any court); infra Part IV.C.2 (discussing provision in
greater detail).
345. President Bush did not issue a signing statement with this legislation. Nor have I
been able to uncover any other public statements about this provision.
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appear to have taken a position on the “conditions of confinement” measure, the second Bush Administration generally sought to avoid judicial
oversight of its actions in the “war on terror.”346 It therefore seems quite
possible that the Administration supported the “conditions of confinement” measure.
As noted above, this Article does not purport to explain every instance in which the executive branch has supported efforts to restrict federal jurisdiction.347 But these counterexamples do not undermine the
central point of this Article: The executive branch has repeatedly served
as an important (and largely unnoticed) protection for the federal judiciary in its jurisdictional struggles with Congress. Indeed, even the story of
the executive’s approach to the MCA is not yet complete. Although the
executive branch did not contest the “conditions of confinement” provision in the legislative process, the DOJ could oppose this restriction via
litigation—a possibility I explore below.
Notably, Congress’s reliance on omnibus and similarly expansive legislation has largely coincided with the Solicitor General’s increased willingness to argue for narrow constructions of jurisdiction-stripping laws.
Since the Supreme Court issued its clear-statement rule in Webster and
related cases, the Solicitor General does not appear to have argued in any
Supreme Court case that a federal statute eliminates federal court review
of constitutional claims.348 Nor has the Solicitor General argued that a
346. Indeed, President George W. Bush initially chose to house noncitizen detainees
at the naval base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in large part to avoid federal judicial
oversight. See Jack Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency: Law and Judgment Inside the Bush
Administration 108 (2007) (“[B]ecause [GTMO] was technically not a part of U.S.
sovereign soil, it seemed like a good bet to minimize judicial scrutiny. . . . [T]he legal
case . . . was not airtight. . . . [But it was] . . . ‘the least worst place’ available.” (quoting
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld)).
347. Notably, the Article focuses on executive responses to legislative efforts to restrict
federal jurisdiction, arguing that the executive branch has a strong incentive to protect the
judiciary from such congressional encroachments. The Article does not address unilateral
executive decisions to allocate certain wartime issues to military tribunals as opposed to the
federal courts, such as President Roosevelt’s decision during World War II to try a group of
Nazi saboteurs by military commission. See Francis Biddle, In Brief Authority 325–31
(1962) (discussing these events). Although the President issued an executive order
purporting to prohibit federal court review of the military tribunal’s decision, see
Proclamation No. 2561, 3 C.F.R. 309 (1943) (stating that such “enemies” “shall not be
privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any proceeding directly or indirectly . . . in the
courts of the United States”), the Supreme Court held that the President’s order did not
apply to a habeas petition challenging the jurisdiction of the military tribunal itself. See Ex
parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25 (1942) (“[N]either the Proclamation nor the fact that they are
enemy aliens forecloses consideration by the courts of petitioners’ contentions that the
Constitution and laws of the United States constitutionally enacted forbid their trial by
military commission.”). The Court ultimately held that the saboteurs could be tried by
military commission. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 48.
348. There are examples of such arguments in the lower courts. For example, the
government argued in lower court proceedings that the statute in Demore v. Kim cut off all
federal jurisdiction. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Demore, supra note 291, at 4–5
(describing government’s position during lower court proceedings that statute in Demore v.
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statute cuts off all avenues to the Supreme Court.349 Accordingly, even as
the Article II safeguards in the legislative process have weakened, the
Article II safeguards in litigation seem to have grown more robust.
C. Implications
Scholars have long overlooked the important role that the executive
branch has played in the jurisdictional struggles between Congress and
the judiciary. The primary goal of this Article is to correct that omission
and to demonstrate that the executive branch has repeatedly used the
structural tools of Article II to protect the Article III courts. But the analysis here may also have broader implications for constitutional scholarship
and for future litigation in the war on terror.
1. Theoretical Implications: Separation of Powers, Not Parties. — Daryl
Levinson and Richard Pildes have offered a powerful challenge to the
traditional conception of separation of powers. Under traditional
Madisonian theory, each branch of government has institutional incentives that lead it to “check” the other branches to ensure that they do not
infringe on constitutional values.350 Professors Levinson and Pildes argue
that this scheme is unlikely to work during periods of unified govern-

Kim cut off all federal jurisdiction). The Solicitor General reversed that position once the
case reached the Supreme Court. See id. at 4 (“[I]t’s the Government’s position, as held by
three courts of appeals, that that provision does not apply to a habeas corpus challenge to
the constitutionality of the statute itself . . . .”). Notably, the Solicitor General does not
oversee all lower court litigation, not even at the appellate level. For that reason, the
Solicitor General cannot ensure consistent DOJ arguments in every case.
349. The government’s approach in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), is
consistent with this claim. The DOJ (through Solicitor General Paul Clement) asserted
that the Detainee Treatment Act, as originally enacted, applied to pending habeas corpus
cases and thus prevented the Supreme Court from reviewing the pending appeal in
Hamdan. Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction at 9–15, Hamdan, 548
U.S. 557 (No. 05-184). But the government emphasized that the statute did not thereby
“leave [Hamdan] without any avenue of judicial review.” Id. at 3. He could “seek review in
the [D.C.] Circuit” and further “review in [the Supreme] Court.” Id. Under the DOJ’s
view, therefore, the statute preserved Supreme Court review (and thus likewise preserved
the Solicitor General’s influence over the development of federal law in terrorism cases).
Ultimately, the Hamdan Court held that the DTA’s jurisdiction-stripping provision did not
apply to pending cases. 548 U.S. at 581–84. The Military Commissions Act effectively
overruled Hamdan by expressly extending the habeas restriction to pending cases. See
MCA, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7, 120 Stat. 2600, 2635–36 (2006) (amending 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(e)(1)).
350. See The Federalist No. 51, at 285 (James Madison) (E.H. Scott ed., 1788) (setting
forth “separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government . . . to be
essential to the preservation of liberty”).
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ment.351 Instead, when the President and Congress are controlled by the
same political party, they are likely to cooperate rather than compete.352
This concept of “separation of parties, not powers” has gained increasing acceptance among scholars and has encouraged scholars to refine prior understandings of our constitutional system.353 The analysis offered by Professors Levinson and Pildes does not, however, explain the
way in which the branches operate in relation to the judiciary.
As the above historical survey demonstrates, the executive branch
has opposed jurisdiction-stripping measures, even during periods of unified government, and even when the measures were sponsored by members of the President’s own party. For example, the Roosevelt
Administration rejected proposals by legislators in the Democratic Party
to eliminate the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction over constitutional claims—even during a period of unified government, when the
Democrats had overwhelming majorities in both chambers of
Congress.354 Likewise, the Reagan Administration strongly opposed the
school prayer proposal championed by President Reagan’s fellow
Republican Senator Jesse Helms.355
This dynamic can be largely explained by the different institutional
incentives of Congress and the executive branch. The executive branch is
in “close contact” with the judiciary—not only because the President
plays a leading role in judicial appointments, but also because he can
351. Levinson & Pildes, supra note 11, at 2385 (“From nearly the start of the
American republic, the separation of powers as the Framers understood it, and as
contemporary constitutional law continues to understand it, had ceased to exist.”).
352. Id. at 2316 (arguing “[t]he greatest threat to constitutional law’s conventional
understanding of, and normative goals for, separation of powers comes when government
is unified”).
353. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, 2006 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures—The Living
Constitution, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 1737, 1809 n.222 (2007) (agreeing with Professors
Levinson and Pildes that “the branches operate very differently depending on whether
they are all controlled by the same party”); Devins & Lewis, supra note 67, at 479 (“[T]he
separation of powers between Congress and the White House has given way to the
‘separation of parties.’”); Goodwin Liu, The Bush Administration and Civil Rights: Lessons
Learned, 4 Duke J. Const. L. & Pub. Pol’y 77, 87 (2009) (“In practice, however,
competition between political parties often displaces competition between the political
branches . . . .”). Other scholars, however, have asserted that the “separation of parties”
argument may be somewhat overstated. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule,
Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 991, 1036 (2008) (arguing “the American
constitutional system . . . displays both separation of powers and parties in a complicated
interaction”).
354. See John P. McIver, Party Affiliation and Public Opinion: Political Party
Affiliations in Congress and the Presidency: 1789–2002, in 5 Historical Statistics of the
United States 200, 201 (Susan B. Carter et al. eds., 2006) (showing Democrats controlled
House 331-89 and Senate 76-16); supra Part II.A (describing Roosevelt Administration’s
resistance to proposals to restrict jurisdiction over constitutional claims).
355. See supra note 155 and accompanying text (discussing Attorney General’s letter
to Congress urging rejection of Senator Helms’s proposal); supra Part II.D (discussing
Reagan Administration’s continuous opposition to jurisdiction stripping).
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“[t]hrough control over the Justice Department . . . exercise significant
influence over . . . what arguments are presented” to the courts.356 These
institutional powers enable the President to influence the development
of federal law through the judiciary—an authority that many leaders have
used to advance their constitutional philosophy.357 The President’s institutional position thus gives him a strong incentive to defend the scope of
federal jurisdiction.
Congress, by contrast, has few ways to directly affect the course of
judicial decisions. Congress may, of course, seek to influence the courts
by changing the size of the judiciary, declining to increase judicial pay, or
even modifying the scope of federal jurisdiction.358 But Congress rarely
speaks directly to the courts in litigation and thus has far less influence
over the development of federal law.359 Indeed, that may be why an allDemocratic Congress balked at Roosevelt’s Court-packing proposal.
Given the executive branch’s influence with the judiciary in normal
times, legislators found “abhorrent” “[t]he idea of giving [the] president . . . the [additional] authority to remake the Supreme Court virtually
overnight.”360
Thus, with respect to the judiciary, Congress and the President have
competing institutional incentives that lead them to approach
jurisdiction-stripping (and other court-curbing) proposals differently. As
Madisonian theory might predict, the executive branch’s institutional incentives—its “ambition” to have greater influence over the development
of federal law—lead it to “resist” congressional encroachments on federal
jurisdiction during periods of both unified and divided government.361
The analysis here thus offers an important correction to the view that the
checks and balances scheme envisioned by Madison depends upon the
“separation of parties.” The federal judiciary has historically been protected by the separation of powers, not parties.
2. Practical Implications: The War on Terror. — This history of executive branch support for the judiciary may have implications not only for
constitutional scholarship but also for future litigation in the war on terror. A provision of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, in terms reminiscent of AEDPA and IIRIRA, purports to cut off all federal jurisdiction
over certain claims:
356. Whittington, Foundations, supra note 50, at 196.
357. See supra notes 50–57 and accompanying text (highlighting presidential efforts
to influence judiciary to further presidential aims).
358. Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Constitution: A Biography 212–14 (2005) (“In fact,
Congress had many weapons to wield or at least brandish against the justices, if it so
chose.”).
359. For an insightful analysis of why Congress acquiesces in presidential control of
litigation, see Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The Battle That Never Was: Congress, the
White House, and Agency Litigation Authority, Law & Contemp. Probs., Winter 1998, at
205, 206.
360. Shesol, supra note 92, at 316.
361. The Federalist No. 51 (James Madison).
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[N]o court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or
consider any . . . action against the United States or its agents
relating to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial,
or conditions of confinement of an alien who is or was detained
by the United States and has been determined by the United
States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or
is awaiting such determination.362
This provision seems to foreclose any challenge to a detainee’s “conditions of confinement” in any court. The legislative history supports that
construction. For example, Senator Lindsay Graham, one of the sponsors
of the jurisdiction-stripping provision, declared that it would “take . . .
conditions of confinement lawsuits off the table.”363 Likewise, Senator
Jesse Bingaman asserted that the legislation “eliminates the ability of
aliens . . . to bring . . . claims related to their detention or their treatment
or their conditions of confinement.”364
The Supreme Court has not ruled on the validity of this provision.365
But several scholars have declared that the “conditions of confinement”
provision is unconstitutional insofar as it precludes federal jurisdiction
over constitutional claims. Thus, Professor Alexander has urged that “the
complete denial of judicial review of constitutional claims is beyond
Congress’s power under the Exceptions . . . Clause,” because it deprives
the Supreme Court of its “essential role.”366 Professors Fallon and
Meltzer have likewise criticized this “total preclusion of judicial review,”
stating that “[i]n the end, the individual’s substantive constitutional
claim . . . may not prevail, but the foreclosure of jurisdiction cannot, by
itself, bar all courts” from even considering the issue.367
This provision of the MCA, like AEDPA and IIRIRA, seems to raise
much-mooted questions about the outer boundaries of Congress’s power
over federal jurisdiction. But once again, the federal courts may be able
to avoid those troubling questions. The executive branch could urge the
courts to construe this provision narrowly in order to preserve federal
jurisdiction over federal constitutional claims.
The DOJ has thus far had few occasions to address the scope of the
MCA’s “conditions of confinement” provision. But the approach of the
Bush Justice Department in Rasul v. Myers may be instructive.368 Rasul
362. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(2) (2006).
363. 152 Cong. Rec. 19,973 (2006) (statement of Sen. Lindsay Graham).
364. Id. at 19,967 (statement of Sen. Jesse Bingaman).
365. In Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008), the Court struck down the
MCA’s habeas restrictions on Suspension Clause grounds, concluding that the alternative
review process (in a military tribunal followed by federal court review) did not provide an
adequate substitute for habeas corpus. Id. at 2274. The Court then declined to “discuss the
reach of the writ with respect to claims of unlawful conditions of treatment or
confinement.” Id.
366. Alexander, supra note 38, at 1208, 1239.
367. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 37, at 2063.
368. 512 F.3d 644 (D.C. Cir. 2008), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 763 (2008), remanded to 563
F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
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involved a group of British citizens who were captured in Afghanistan and
then detained at Guantanamo Bay from 2002 until 2004 (when they were
released and returned to the United Kingdom).369 The plaintiffs claimed
that they were “systematically and repeatedly tortured throughout their
two-year detention at Guantanamo” and that high-level government officials knew about this “torture and mistreatment.”370 They brought a
Bivens claim, asserting that the interrogation tactics used against them
“constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment” and that “the cruel, inhuman or degrading conditions at
Guantanamo” violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.371
The suit in Rasul would seem on its face to be an “action against the
United States or its agents relating to . . . [the] conditions of confinement” of alleged enemy combatants, thus triggering the jurisdictional bar
in the MCA.372 The case therefore should have raised serious questions
about the scope of Congress’s power over federal jurisdiction.
But the Justice Department never raised the jurisdictional issue. Instead, the DOJ urged the court to dismiss the constitutional and other
claims on the merits, arguing in part that the government officials were
entitled to qualified immunity.373 Nor did the courts question their jurisdiction over the action, but instead simply ruled in the government’s
369. See Rasul, 512 F.3d at 649–50.
370. Id. at 650.
371. Id. at 663 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (creating private right of action to
seek monetary damages for constitutional violations by state actors).
372. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(2) (2006). Notably, it does not appear that the plaintiffs in
Rasul ever had their status determined by a combatant status review tribunal (CSRT),
because the government did not begin using such tribunals until after their departure in
2004. Thus, there might be a question whether they were “properly determined” to be
enemy combatants for the purposes of § 2241. But the MCA does not define an “enemy
combatant” solely based on a CSRT determination. See Military Commissions Act of 2006,
Pub. L. 109-366, § 3(a), 120 Stat. 2600, 2601 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948a) (defining
enemy combatant as person who “has engaged in hostilities . . . against the United States”
or who “has been determined to be an unlawful enemy combatant by a Combatant Status
Review Tribunal or another competent tribunal established under the authority of the
President or the Secretary of Defense”). Likewise, the legislative history indicates that at
least some members of Congress sought to bar review whether or not a CSRT was held. See
152 Cong. Rec. 20,319 (2006) (statement of Sen. John Cornyn) (“This new language . . .
eliminates the requirement that the D.C. Circuit review a CSRT, or that a CSRT even be
held, before nonhabeas actions are barred. . . . [M]any detainees were released before
CSRTs were . . . instituted. We do not want those who were properly detained . . . to be able
to sue the U.S. military.”); id. at 20,320 (statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions) (“The new bill . . .
bars all litigation by anyone found to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant,
regardless of whether the detainee . . . has been through a [CSRT] hearing.”).
373. See Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 10, Rasul v. Myers, 130 S. Ct. 1013
(2009) (No. 09-227) [hereinafter Brief for Respondents, Rasul] (making qualified
immunity argument); Brief for Appellees/Cross-Appellants at 12, Rasul, 512 F.3d 644 (Nos.
06-5209, 06-5222) (same).
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favor on the merits.374 Thus, although the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims
“[i]n the end . . . [did] not prevail,”375 the federal courts were not prevented from considering the issue.
It is not yet clear what approach the current Justice Department will
take with respect to the “conditions of confinement” provision.376 But as
it contemplates its approach, the executive could consider how prior administrations have dealt with similar statutes.
The DOJ could draw upon the practice of the Clinton and Bush
Administrations in the litigation over AEDPA and IIRIRA. There, in the
face of equally broad jurisdiction-stripping language, the DOJ urged the
federal courts to construe the statutes narrowly in order to preserve jurisdiction over constitutional claims.377 Likewise, the Obama Justice
Department could argue: “Notwithstanding [the MCA]’s categorical language, neither the text nor the legislative history . . . adverts specifically to
374. The D.C. Circuit initially held that the Guantanamo detainees lacked
constitutional rights. See Rasul, 512 F.3d at 663–65. The Supreme Court later remanded
the case for reconsideration in light of its decision in Boumediene, see Rasul v. Myers, 129 S.
Ct. 763, 763 (2008), and the court of appeals ultimately rejected the plaintiffs’
constitutional claims on qualified immunity grounds, see Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 532
(D.C. Cir. 2009). The Supreme Court subsequently denied certiorari. Rasul, 130 S. Ct.
1013.
375. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 37, at 2063.
376. The Obama Administration maintained the same position as the Bush Justice
Department in Rasul, declining to question jurisdiction and seeking a favorable decision
on the merits. See Brief for Respondents, Rasul, supra note 373, at I (citing only questions
of qualified immunity). But, in a recent “conditions of confinement” case in the lower
courts, which also involved Bivens claims, the Obama Justice Department did raise the
jurisdictional bar. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Individual
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Constitutional Claims at 4, Al-Zahrani v.
Rumsfeld, 684 F. Supp. 2d 103 (D.D.C. 2010) (No. 1:09-CV-00028 (ESH)), 2009 WL
2249118, at *6 (quoting In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 577 F. Supp. 2d 312, 314
(D.D.C. 2008)) (arguing statute strips court of conditions of confinement jurisdiction).
Yet, in district court, after the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the
jurisdictional bar, see Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Individual Defendants’
and United States’ Motions to Dismiss and United States’ Motion to Substitute at 10–22, AlZahrani, 684 F. Supp. 2d 103 (No. 1:09-CV-00028 (ESH)), 2009 WL 4920681, at *8–*18, the
DOJ made little effort to defend the statute and instead invited the district court to rule on
the Bivens claims on the merits. See Reply Memorandum in Support of the Individual
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Constitutional Claims at 4–6 & n.3, Al-Zahrani,
684 F. Supp. 2d 103 (No. 1:09-cv-00028 (ESH)), 2009 WL 5899645, at *4–*7 & n.3 (“[T]he
Court may resolve Plaintiffs’ claims on special factors and qualified immunity grounds
alone.”). The district court accepted that invitation. See Al-Zahrani, 684 F. Supp. 2d at
110–12 (declining to decide jurisdictional issue and dismissing Bivens claims on merits).
The government seems to have taken a similar approach on appeal. See Brief for
Defendants-Appellees at 52, Al-Zahrani v. Rodriguez, No. 10-5393 (D.C Cir. filed July 13,
2011), 2011 WL 2729234, at *52 (arguing court of appeals could “affirm without reaching
[plaintiffs’] constitutional challenge” to § 2241(e)(2)). Notably, the Solicitor General does
not supervise all lower court litigation. Accordingly, the Solicitor General will not
necessarily adopt the same approach in later stages of this case or future cases.
377. See supra notes 270–280 and accompanying text (detailing DOJ arguments
regarding AEDPA and IIRIRA legislation).
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preclusion of review of constitutional claims . . . .”378 Accordingly, the
federal courts “retain authority to consider such claims.”379
Such an approach would help ensure that many of the questions
about Congress’s power over federal jurisdiction would go unresolved.
And there is much to be said for this “avoidance” approach. As Barry
Friedman has asserted, there may be reasons to leave the lines of congressional authority over federal jurisdiction in doubt. “Uncertainty breeds
caution,” deterring Congress from advancing policies through jurisdictional restrictions, without removing the possibility that Congress could
rely on that authority at some point.380 The executive branch could encourage the courts to leave the issue unresolved by again insisting that
“[i]f Congress wants to frustrate the judicial check,” it must “say so
unmistakably.”381
CONCLUSION
Jurisdiction stripping has long been treated as a battle between
Congress and the federal courts. Scholars have thus overlooked the important (and surprising) role that the executive branch has played in
these jurisdictional struggles. The President and the Department of
Justice have strong institutional incentives to defend the scope of federal
jurisdiction. Because of their “close contact” with the federal judiciary,382
these executive officials can use litigation to have a substantial impact
upon “the development of American law” and “the establishment of constitutional . . . principles.”383
For this reason, the executive branch has repeatedly opposed
jurisdiction-stripping legislation in Congress (even when the President
otherwise strongly disagreed with the federal courts’ jurisprudence).
Likewise, the Justice Department has repeatedly urged the courts to construe jurisdiction-stripping laws narrowly. The executive branch has thus
proven to be an important ally for the federal courts, using the structural
tools of Article II to ensure that Congress complies not only with the letter but also with “the structure and spirit of the [Constitution].”384

378. Brief for Respondent, Calcano-Martinez, supra note 272, at 23 (emphasis added).
379. Id.
380. Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress and
Federal Jurisdiction, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 58 (1990).
381. Hart, supra note 24, at 1399.
382. Whittington, Foundations, supra note 50, at 196.
383. Days, supra note 69, at 680.
384. Bator, supra note 4, at 1039.
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